Alan Bassani v. R. Sutton

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 29 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALAN BASSANI, No. 10-35482
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-03012-RHW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
R. SUTTON, a Yakima County Animal
Control Officer; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD, TASHIMA, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
This is a constitutional-tort claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
underlying facts are known to the parties and need not be repeated. Alan Bassani
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants Randy
Sutton, the Yakima County Sheriff’s Department, and Yakima County. Bassani’s
complaint alleged that Sutton (as Yakima County’s Animal Control Officer)
violated principles of due process when he seized one of Bassani’s two dogs. The
district court held that Bassani’s claims were barred by res judicata because
Bassani had brought a previous lawsuit, in which he successfully petitioned for the
release of one of these dogs. The district court also denied his motion to amend his
complaint to include both dogs, based on undue delay and undue prejudice.
Bassani argues that the district court incorrectly relied on a prior decision of
this court interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) rather than Civil Rule
15(a). See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000). But
Bassani misreads our decision. In fact, Coleman addressed both Rule 16 and Rule
15, including the prejudice requirement under Rule 15. See id. at 1295. In any
event, we hold that the district court’s ultimate conclusions—that there would be
undue delay and prejudice to the defendants if Bassani were allowed to amend his
complaint two years into litigation and after the close of discovery—were not an
abuse of discretion.
2
To the contrary, our case law shows that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that allowing such an amendment after discovery had
already concluded would have prejudiced the defendants and caused undue delay
given the two years that had already elapsed. See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen Corp.
v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006); Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). And this was
especially true where, as here, Bassani had known about the facts and legal theories
giving rise to his amendments from his suit’s inception. See Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986).
We therefore AFFIRM.
3