Jacob Pratt v. Deeds

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 16 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JACOB RAMIE PRATT, No. 12-16291
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00615-RCJ-VPC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEEDS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 13, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Jacob Ramie Pratt appeals from the district court’s
order granting summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in favor of
defendants, who are current and former correctional officers at Ely State Prison.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013). We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I
The district court erred in granting summary judgment on Pratt’s claim that
the defendant officers violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force
after they fully restrained him and he was no longer struggling. Pratt does not
dispute that the defendants used reasonable force in subduing him during the cell
extraction. However, the parties offered markedly different accounts of the force
used after Pratt was restrained. If true, Pratt’s allegations that the defendants
repeatedly punched him in the face after restraining him, repeatedly slammed his
head into a sliding door and wall, and pinned him against the wall while one of
them pinched and twisted his skin and nipples, establish a “malicious and sadistic”
use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d
898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). While the exigencies of the cell extraction and Pratt’s
violent attack on one of the officers warranted the use of force to subdue and
restrain Pratt, they would not justify the subsequent acts alleged. See Hudson v.
McMilliam, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (holding that “the core judicial inquiry” in
resolving an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is “whether force was
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applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm”). In granting summary judgment, the district court
erred by resolving disputed issues of material fact in the defendants’ favor. See
Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1026 (affirming that a court reviewing a summary judgment
motion must “assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party”).1
II
The district court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Pratt’s claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs. To
prevail on this claim, Pratt must show that he was “confined under conditions
posing a risk of ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ harm and that the officials had a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ in denying the proper medical care.” Clement,
298 F.3d at 904 (quoting Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995)).
On the objective prong, the defendants introduced evidence that Pratt sustained
minor injuries that were addressed by first aid treatment. Pratt failed to respond
with evidence of more serious injuries. Even assuming Pratt created a triable issue
as to the seriousness of his injuries, he has failed to allege that any defendant was
1
Because a reasonable correctional officer would know that the treatment
alleged would violate Pratt’s constitutional rights, we decline to affirm on the
alternate ground that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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subjectively aware of an excessive risk of serious harm to Pratt from the denial of
additional medical care. See id. (describing subjective component of “deliberate
indifference” standard). Because no reasonable jury could find for Pratt on this
claim, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
III
In sum, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to Pratt’s Eighth
Amendment claim and affirm the grant of summary judgment as to his deliberate
indifference claim. Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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