Pierce v. Itkin

MEMORANDUM ^**

In these consolidated appeals, Stephanie G. Pierce appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging that the defendants engaged in fraud and perjury in a prior civil suit, and the district court’s subsequent award of sanctions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court properly construed Pierce’s complaint as a motion for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), and exercised removal jurisdiction. See Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir.1994). We review for abuse of discretion a motion to reconsider or reopen under Rule 60(b) and the entry of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 183, 148 L.Ed.2d 126 (2000); Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1236 (9th Cir.1990).

In appeal No. 00-35158, we affirm the judgment for the reasons stated in the district court’s order filed January 14, 2000.

In appeal No. 00-35695, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Wages, 915 F.2d at 1236.

Pierce’s remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.