Miguel Garcia v. Honeywell International

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 2 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL GARCIA, AKA Miguel Garcia No. 12-17353
Rebollo,
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00840-FJM
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Delaware corporation; HONEYWELL
AEROSPACE DE MEXICO SA DE CV,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 21, 2015**
Before: CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Garcia, AKA Miguel Garcia Rebollo, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his Title VII employment action for wrongful termination,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
harassment, retaliation, discrimination, unlawful employment practices, and
emotional distress. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121
(9th Cir. 2003) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s claims for discrimination,
harassment, retaliation, unlawful employment practices, and wrongful termination
arising out of his June 9, 2009 termination because Garcia failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under Title VII in a proper manner. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1) (a person seeking relief under Title VII must file a charge with the
state or local EEOC administrative agency within 300 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice).
The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s claims for discrimination,
harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination arising out of his March 16, 2010
termination because Garcia failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he was
subject to adverse employment actions due to a protected activity or status under
Title VII. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642, 646 (9th Cir.
2003) (elements of hostile work environment, harassment, and retaliation claims
under Title VII); Leong, 347 F.3d at 1124 (elements of discrimination claim under
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Title VII).
The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress because the conduct alleged in Garcia’s complaint was
neither extreme nor outrageous. See Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666,
668 (Ariz. 1969), overruled on other grounds by Godbehere v. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989) (defendant’s conduct must be so
outrageous and extreme “as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Gardner v. Martino, 563
F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that
“[a] district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment
would be futile”).
We reject Garcia’s contentions relating to judicial bias and due process
violations.
AFFIRMED.
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