Guoku Hu v. Loretta E. Lynch

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 08 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
GUOKU HU, No. 13-70902
Petitioner, Agency No. A088-291-909
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 3, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and RAKOFF,*** Senior
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Guoku Hu petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications
for asylum and withholding of removal.1
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the fine imposed on
Hu did not amount to economic deprivation rising to the level of past persecution.
“[S]ubstantial economic deprivation that constitutes a threat to life or freedom can
constitute persecution.” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006).
However, “mere economic disadvantage alone, does not rise to the level of
persecution.” Id. (quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.
2004)). Although this fine was significant in comparison to Hu’s stated income,
Hu did not testify that he could not earn a living or suffered more than mere
economic disadvantage. Thus, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to
find that Hu demonstrated past persecution.
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Hu failed to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Hu argues that he is subject to
1
Hu did not request protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Nonetheless, the IJ and BIA considered his eligibility and denied relief. Hu did not
challenge this issue in his opening brief. Therefore, it is waived. See
Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).
2
future persecution because of his anti-corruption activities.2 A finding of a
“well-founded fear of persecution” requires both a showing of “subjectively
genuine” and “objectively reasonable” fear. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th
Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam). Even if Hu subjectively fears that he will be
persecuted if he returns to China, Hu has failed to present specific, objective
evidence to support his fear of future persecution.
3. Because Hu failed to prove that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in
China, he also failed to prove by a “clear probability” that he will suffer
persecution if he returns, which is required for withholding of removal. See
Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
2
Hu argues that the IJ and the BIA did not credit Hu’s testimony as credible.
However, Hu fails to point to any material testimony that the BIA and IJ
discredited.
3