Daniel Dixon v. J. O'Connor

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 10 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL STEVE DIXON, No. 12-15825
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01546-LDG
v.
MEMORANDUM *
J. S. O’CONNOR, Correctional Officer; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lloyd D. George, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 24, 2013 **
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Steve Dixon, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs and retaliation for filing prison
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
grievances. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dixon’s retaliation claims because
Dixon failed to allege that defendants’ actions did not advance legitimate
correctional purposes. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-09 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the timing of adverse actions alone is not sufficient to support the
inference of a retaliatory motive and that a prisoner must show that there were no
legitimate correctional purposes for conduct alleged to be retaliatory).
The district court properly dismissed Dixon’s claims based on deliberate
indifference to his medical needs because Dixon failed to allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate that defendants’ knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his
health. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (prison
officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an
excessive risk to a prisoner’s health).
The district court properly dismissed Dixon’s claims against the supervisory
defendants because Dixon failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal
involvement in the alleged violations or a causal connection between their conduct
and the alleged violations. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (“A defendant may be held
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liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal
involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection
between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’ ”
(citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dixon’s requests for
appointment of counsel. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009)
(setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
Dismissal of Dixon’s amended complaint without leave to amend was
proper because the district court had previously provided Dixon with the
opportunity to amend, and further amendment would have been futile. See
AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006)
(district court need not grant leave to amend where amendment would be futile).
We reject as unpersuasive Dixon’s contentions that the district court
committed reversible error by denying his motion to “consolidate” the motions to
dismiss, and by failing to address his motion for reconsideration of the court’s
prior order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction before ruling on the
motions to dismiss.
Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Dixon’s supplemental excerpts of
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record that were not part of the district court record is granted.
AFFIRMED.
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