Anthony Herbert v. Claudia Balducci

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY G. HERBERT, No. 15-35400
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01429-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CLAUDIA BALDUCCI; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Anthony G. Herbert appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian
Fellowship v. Cty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Herbert’s access-
to-court claim because Herbert failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he requested access to the law library computer workstations and
defendants denied him access. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-49, 354-55
(1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim); Johnson v. Duffy,
588 F.2d 740, 743-744 (9th Cir. 1978) (liability under § 1983 requires evidence of
individual participation in the alleged violation). Moreover, Herbert failed to raise
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged denial of access to
computer workstations resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom of
defendant King County. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94
(1978) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 claim of municipal liability).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Herbert’s
constitutional claims related to restrictions on reading material and telephone
access while in disciplinary segregation because Herbert failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the restrictions were not reasonably related to
a legitimate governmental objective. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39
(1979) (“Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention
facility officials . . . if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to ‘punishment.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Pratt v.
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Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of
pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct
of which he complains.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgement on Herbert’s First
Amendment claims related to the denial of Alcoholics Anonymous’ Big Book
while in disciplinary segregation because Herbert failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether the denial substantially burdened his ability to
practice his religion or violated the Establishment Clause. See Shakur v. Schriro,
514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (Free Exercise Clause is only implicated
when a prison practice burdens an inmate’s sincerely-held religious beliefs);
Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth test for
Establishment Clause violation).
We reject as without merit Herbert’s contentions that the district court did
not apply the legal standards applicable to a pretrial detainee and overlooked his
First Amendment claims.
We do not consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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