United States v. Skyler Fowler

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 01 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-10048
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:08-cr-00042-RCJ-VPC-1
v.
ORDER and
SKYLER JAMES FOWLER, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 27, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Skyler James Fowler appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his
supervised release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. His appeal includes
challenges to the district court’s imposition of special supervised release
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). This case is resubmitted as
of February 27, 2017.
conditions. While this appeal was pending, the court learned that Fowler had been
arrested following the stabbing death of his girlfriend. The court stayed appellate
proceedings pending completion of state proceedings requiring Fowler’s presence,
and directed the parties to file status updates. In their latest status updates, the
parties advised the court that Fowler pled guilty to second-degree murder with the
use of a deadly weapon, and the state court sentenced him to life imprisonment
with parole eligibility beginning after a minimum of ten years.
We remand this case to the district court in light of these recent events.
Upon remand, for example, the district court may wish to re-examine Fowler’s
supervised release conditions at a time closer to Fowler’s release from state
custody, if he is ever released. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (“A term of supervised
release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in
connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the
imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.”); cf. United States
v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Facts and relationships may change
over the years, and the district court may wish to re-examine the special conditions
at a time closer to [the defendant’s] release, when more facts will be clear.”);
United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 193 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Were this,
however, a case involving supervised release, or if there were any reasons why the
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commencement of the defendant’s term of probation would be substantially
delayed, it might well be prudent for the district court to postpone the
determination of the supervised release or probation conditions until an appropriate
later time, when the district court’s decision could be based on then-existing
technological and other considerations.”).
Moreover, if the district court revokes Fowler’s supervised release (such as
based on an allegation that he violated the conditions of his supervised release by
committing a state crime), Fowler’s challenges to the conditions of that supervised
release may become moot. Cf. United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th
Cir. 2009) (“Because [the defendant’s] term of probation was revoked, his appeal
of the conditions of probation is moot, except to the extent that he alleges the
revocation was based on a purported violation of an invalid condition” (citation
omitted)).
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings as the district court deems appropriate. The panel no longer retains
jurisdiction.
REMANDED.
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