J. K. Ex Rel. K.K-R. v. Missoula County Public Schools

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
J. K. and J. C., on behalf of themselves and No. 16-35687
on behalf of K.K-R., a minor,
D.C. No. 9:15-cv-00122-RWA
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MISSOULA COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Richard W. Anderson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Before: M. SMITH and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GORDON,** District
Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants J.K. and J.C. bring this appeal on behalf of their
daughter, K.K-R., asserting that the Missoula County Public Schools (“MCPS”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400, et seq. when it failed to evaluate K.K-R. for special education services
until 2013. After a 15-day administrative due process hearing, the hearing officer
denied Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims, concluding that the IDEA’s two-year statute
of limitations barred Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims before 2012, and that MCPS did
not violate the IDEA. Plaintiffs-Appellants then filed suit in federal court, and the
district court dismissed Plaintiffs-Appellants’ amended complaint and entered
judgment for MCPS. Reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error,
see N.B. v. Hellgate Elem. Sch. Dist. ex rel Bd. of Dirs., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th
Cir. 2008), we affirm.
“[T]he IDEA’s statute of limitations requires courts to bar only claims
brought more than two years after the parents or local educational agency ‘knew or
should have known’ about the actions forming the basis of the complaint.” Avila v.
Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 852 F.3d 936, 937 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(C). The record supports the district court’s finding that Plaintiffs-
Appellants knew or should have known the alleged action forming the basis of
their complaint by August 2009 when they first enrolled K.K-R. in middle school.
Because Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to file their claims until October 1, 2014, their
claims arising prior to October 1, 2012, are barred by the statute of limitations.
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As a state entity receiving assistance under the IDEA, MCPS has an
obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate all students with disabilities in its
boundaries. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see also, e.g., Compton Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Addision, 598 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010). The duty to evaluate a
student arises when disability is “suspected,” or “when the district has notice that
the child has displayed symptoms of that disability.” Timothy O. v. Paso Robles
Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2016). MCPS knew in the spring
of 2010 that K.K-R. was hospitalized for suicidal ideations, arguably triggering its
child find obligation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(defining “child with a disability”
to include a child with “serious emotional disturbance”); see also L.J. by and
through Hudson v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1006–07 (9th Cir.
2017) (finding that a student who exhibited behavioral issues and attempted suicide
outside of school required special education services). Therefore, the district court
may have erred in finding that MCPS did not violate its child find obligation in the
spring of 2010. Nevertheless, because the two-year statute of limitations on this
violation lapsed in the spring of 2012 and Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their claim in
October 2014, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claim on this issue is barred. See 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(C); see also Avila, 852 F.3d at 937.
The record otherwise reflects that MCPS allowed Plaintiffs-Appellants to
participate in developing K.K-R.’s educational plan and, contrary to Plaintiffs-
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Appellants’ claim, had not “predetermined” K.K-R.’s placement. See K.D. ex rel
C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a
school district violates the IDEA if it predetermines placement for a student before
developing the child’s individualized education plan (“IEP”)). Additionally, the
record supports the district court’s finding that MCPS developed an IEP that
appeared “reasonably calculated” to enable K.K-R. to make progress in Missoula
County schools. See Endrew F. ex rel Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty Sch. Dist. RE-1,
137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (holding that “[t]o meet its substantive obligation under
the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”). Because MCPS
complied with IDEA’s procedural and substantive requirements beginning in
October 2012, Plaintiffs-Appellants are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs
of placing K.K-R. at Maple Lake Academy. See W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target
Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1485–86 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
parents have an equitable right to reimbursement only if a school district has failed
to offer a child free appropriate public education) superseded in part by statute on
other grounds; see also Everett v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 28 F. App’x 683,
685 (9th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED.
4