United States v. Tyler Bateman

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 10 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30006
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:18-cr-00042-TMB-MMS-1
v.
TYLER CHANCE BATEMAN, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 8, 2022**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Tyler Bateman appeals the district court’s imposition of special conditions of
supervised release, specifically those that prohibit him from posting on social media.
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
We review de novo whether supervised release conditions violate the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Constitution. United States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the
challenged conditions are constitutional because they are reasonably related to the
goals of deterrence, public protection, and Bateman’s rehabilitation; they involve no
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve these goals;
and they are not inconsistent with any policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. Id. at 590 (quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). We have acknowledged that broad restrictions on Internet
use are permissible when, as here, “use of the Internet was ‘essential’ or ‘integral’
to the offense of conviction.” United States v. LaCoste, 821 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2016). Unlike in other cases in which we have struck down restrictions on
Internet use, the prohibition here is “not absolute” and “allows for approval of
appropriate online access by the Probation Office.” United States v. Rearden, 349
F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Riley, 576 F.3d 1046, 1048–
50 (9th Cir. 2009). Bateman’s own attorney conceded repeatedly that his client is
such a habitual maker of electronic threats that his social media usage should be
restricted. And Bateman’s behavior immediately upon release strongly supports
such concessions, as do his statements to the Probation Office that he would continue
to violate the conditions.
Because Bateman did not object to the conditions before the district court, we
review their imposition for plain error. LaCoste, 821 F.3d at 1190. To show a plain
2
error, Bateman must show that the district court committed (1) “an error” that was
(2) “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute,” and that (3) such
error “must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights.” Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). Bateman cannot show that the district court
committed an error. The district judge committed no procedural error because he
adequately explained the challenged conditions. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d
984, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). And the district judge committed no
substantive error in imposing the challenged conditions, for the same reasons
discussed above. See United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.
2012); Soltero, 510 F.3d at 866.
AFFIRMED.
3