United States v. Taloa Latu

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 31 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10069
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:17-cr-00364-JMS-1
v.
TALOA LATU, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 7, 2022
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Taloa Latu appeals his conviction and sentence for assault resulting in
serious bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). Latu attacked another inmate,
Joseph Yamaguchi, while incarcerated at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
on September 11, 2016. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.1
1. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury that “‘[s]erious
bodily injury’ means bodily injury that involves (1) extreme physical pain; or (2)
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a body part or organ.” The district
court’s instruction included two of the alternative ways of showing serious bodily
injury listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3). See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), (b)(2)
(incorporating section 1365(h)’s definition of serious bodily injury). Because the
government could meet its burden by establishing either one of those alternatives,
the district court’s instruction was neither legally inadequate nor misleading. See
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 506 (2016) (explaining that statutory
alternatives are a “kind of list [that] merely specifies diverse means of satisfying a
single element of a single crime—or, otherwise said, spells out various factual
ways of committing some component of the offense—a jury need not find . . . any
particular item.”). Therefore, the instruction was not plainly erroneous. See
United States v. Rodriguez, 971 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An unpreserved
objection is subject to plain error review.”).
2. Latu argues that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.
1
We address Latu’s challenge to the admission of Yamaguchi’s statements
made to medical providers in a separate opinion filed concurrently with this
disposition.
2
First, Latu argues that there was insufficient evidence that he caused the injuries
for which Yamaguchi sought medical assistance an hour and twenty-five minutes
after the attack. However, the video recording of the incident shows Latu
repeatedly punching and kicking Yamaguchi in a manner consistent with
Yamaguchi’s injuries, and it shows Yamaguchi limping away from the scene with
a bloodstained shirt. Yamaguchi also told Nurse Chi and Dr. Michino that his
injuries were caused by an assault. Considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Latu’s
attack caused Yamaguchi’s injuries. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158,
1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (setting forth test for evaluating sufficiency of the
evidence). Although Latu points to a phone conversation Yamaguchi had between
being attacked and seeking medical help, neither that nor any other arguably
exculpatory evidence merits reversal in this case because the government need not
“rule out every hypothesis except that of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979)).
Second, Latu argues that Yamaguchi’s injuries were not sufficiently serious
as a matter of law to constitute serious bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6).
As discussed above, the jury was instructed that it could find serious bodily injury
if Yamaguchi suffered “(1) extreme physical pain; or (2) protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a body part or organ.” Cf. 18 U.S.C.
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§ 1365(h)(3)(B), (D). Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of serious
bodily injury under either alternative. As to extreme physical pain, Yamaguchi
stated to Nurse Chi that his pain level was an eight out of ten, his pain was treated
with oxycodone for around two weeks, and Dr. Yost testified that patients find
broken ribs to be painful. As to protracted impairment, Yamaguchi sustained a
broken jaw, which had to be wired shut for weeks, and his broken ribs made it
difficult to breathe properly. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that Yamaguchi suffered
serious bodily injury. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164; see also United States v.
Mejia-Luna, 562 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have long held that ‘the
existence and definition of serious bodily injury in a given case is primarily a jury
question dependent upon an evaluation of all the circumstances of the injury or
injuries.’” (citation omitted)).
3. Latu finally argues that his sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment
was substantively unreasonable. We disagree. Latu’s Guidelines range was sixty-
three to seventy-eight months. The district court varied upwards after concluding
that a sentence within the Guidelines range would be insufficient to accomplish the
goals of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court pointed
to several factors warranting an above-Guidelines sentence, including that the
offense conduct was “premeditate[d]” and “very, very disturbing,” that Latu’s
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criminal history reflected a pattern of similar violence that made Latu a danger to
others and likely to re-offend, and that the assault took place within the
“combustible” environment of a prison. Because each of these considerations was
supported by the record and supported an above-Guidelines sentence, the district
court’s upward variance was not an abuse of discretion and Latu’s sentence was
reasonable. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 990-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (explaining framework for reviewing substantive reasonableness).
AFFIRMED.
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