Arthur Hernandez, Jr. v. Pacific Maritime Association

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 19 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR HERNANDEZ, JR., No. 08-55490
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-05230-R-AGR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION
and JANET SNYDER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 9, 2009
Pasadena, California
Before: HALL and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and LAWSON,** District Judge.
Plaintiff Arthur Hernandez, Jr. appeals from the orders of the district court
denying his motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable David M. Lawson, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
court also dismissed Hernandez’s case without prejudice, but he does not challenge
that order. He argues that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over his
second amended complaint, which pleaded only state law claims, and therefore the
court should have granted his motion to remand to state court. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see De Tie v. Orange County, 152 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir.
1998) (distinguishing between the dismissal of a complaint with leave to amend,
which is a non-final order, and the dismissal of an action, even if it is without
prejudice, which is a final order), and we affirm.
The key question in this appeal is whether resolution of one or more of the
causes of action in the plaintiff’s second amended complaint “depends upon the
meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). An affirmative answer to that question sets in
motion the cascade of legal determinations that concludes in the finding that the state
law claim is completely preempted by federal labor law, specifically section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, which displaces the
state law claim and results in a proper finding that the district court had federal
question jurisdiction over the action, with authority to dismiss it. See Caterpillar Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (“[T]he pre-emptive force of § 301 [of the
LMRA] is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation
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of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. Any such suit is purely
a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause
of action in the absence of § 301.”) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We agree with the district court that resolution of the plaintiff’s claims of
intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage cannot
be achieved without interpreting the Pacific Coast Longshore Contract Document (the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into by defendant Pacific Maritime
Association (PMA) and the International Longshore and Warehouse Union), and the
Coastwise Rules Covering Registration and Deregistration of Longshoremen and
Clerks (the side agreement that regulated the dispatch list for casual laborers).
Under California law, the tort of interference with prospective economic
advantage requires proof, among other things, of the existence of an economic
relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, with the probability of future
economic benefit to the plaintiff. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
791 P.2d 587, 590 n.2 (Cal. 1990) (quoting Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 733 n.6
(Cal. 1987)). The plaintiff also must prove that the interference was “wrongful by
some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.” Overstock.com, Inc. v.
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Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 751 (Cal. 1995)).
Resolution of these claims will require interpretation of the CBA for several
reasons. First, interpretation of the CBA and related documents is required to
determine whether an economic relationship existed between Hernandez and the
employers. PMA alleges that the plaintiff had been removed from the dispatch list in
2003 under the Port Hueneme Joint Port Labor Relations Committee’s (JPLRC) rules,
which ended his economic relationship with the employers and made impossible any
future economic benefit from the employers. The JPLRC regulates dispatch lists
using the Coastwise Rules, which fall under the “CBA” rubric for the purpose of
section 301 preemption. See Inlandboatmens Union of the Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279
F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that “a collective bargaining agreement
is not limited solely to the specific provisions of the basic labor contract formally
executed by the parties, but it may also include, among other things, written side
agreements and oral understandings entered into by the parties”). If the CBA or the
Coastwise Rules provide for removal from dispatch lists based on an absence from the
dispatch halls and the plaintiff was subject to removal thereunder, then he no longer
had an economic relationship with the employers at the time of PMA’s allegedly
tortious conduct. Since the plaintiff disputes the validity or relevance of his removal
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from the dispatch list, a court would be required to determine the meaning of the
relevant rules and the effect of the JPLRC’s action removing the plaintiff from the
dispatch list. Such a determination necessarily amounts to a “state law factual inquiry
. . . [that] turn[s] on the meaning of a[] provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement.” Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Second, after the plaintiff proves that there is an economic relationship, he must
also prove that “it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have
been realized but for defendant’s interference.” Youst, 729 P.2d at 733. The parties
accept the fact that all longshore work on the West Coast is governed by the CBA, and
the plaintiff could not work and be paid as a casual worker unless the JPLRC finds
reinstatement of the plaintiff to the dispatch list proper under the CBA and the
Coastwise Rules. The JPLRC has authority “under the CBA to limit the number of
workers in each category [i.e., casuals, identified casuals, B registered workers, and
A registered workers] to conform to the volume of available work.” Audette v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999).
Therefore, any interpretation of the JPLRC’s ability to reinstate casual workers under
the CBA would require interpretation of the CBA and the Coastwise Rules.
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Third, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff was properly removed from the
list in 2003 for reasons unrelated to the alleged false statements on his U.S.
Department of Labor Form LS-208. If that is true, the removal would not be
“wrongful,” Overstock.com, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 49, since it would have been
authorized by the CBA or a related side agreement. A determination of whether the
removal was actually authorized by the CBA requires interpretation of the CBA.
Fourth, the defendants argue that they refused to reinstate the plaintiff to the
dispatch list because he submitted false documentation on his Form LS-208 and
thereby violated section 9.11 of the Coastwise Rules, which required the revocation
of a casual worker’s dispatch privileges. The parties dispute whether section 9.11
even applies to casual workers, and whether a violation of that rule actually bars
reinstatement. The district court, therefore, would have to determine whether section
9.11 gave the JPLRC authority to deny the plaintiff’s request for reinstatement, and
then decide whether the plaintiff actually submitted false documentation as defined
by the Coastwise Rules. Proof of a necessary element of the plaintiff’s state law cause
of action – that is, the wrongfulness of the interference – thus requires interpretation
of the CBA and the related Coastwise Rules.
Because the plaintiff’s state law claims for intentional and negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage was preempted by section 301 of
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the LMRA, the district court had federal question jurisdiction over at least some of the
plaintiff’s claims. Subject matter jurisdiction over the balance of the claims in the
amended complaint was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The denial of the motion
to remand was correct. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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