United States v. Lazaro Limon-Juvera

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 29 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50505
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00951-AJB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LAZARO LIMON-JUVERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 26, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,
District Judge.**
Lazaro Limon-Juvera appeals his jury conviction for being a deported alien
found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
I
The district court did not abuse its discretion when excluding evidence of
Limon-Juvera’s Tohono O’odham membership and in determining that it was
“speculative,” “not reasonable,” and raised “a 403 issue.” See Fed. R. Evid. 403;
United States v. Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2011).
II
Limon-Juvera had also raised two issues regarding his sentence, but was
released from custody on July 25, 2014 and has since affirmatively waived such
arguments. Accordingly, we dismiss the sentencing challenges as moot.
III
We remand this case for the district court to correct the judgment to reflect
that Limon-Juvera was found guilty following a jury trial rather than pursuant to a
guilty plea.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
FOR CORRECTION OF JUDGMENT.
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FILED
United States v. Limon-Juvera, No. 13-50505 OCT 29 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
GLEASON, District Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I join Part II of the majority disposition, dismissing the sentencing
challenges as moot.
In Part I, the majority holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it precluded Limon-Juvera from introducing certain evidence. I respectfully
dissent from that portion of the Court’s determination.
At trial, the Government’s proof on the element of alienage was limited to
Limon-Juvera’s admissions of citizenship to agents and in prior proceedings.
Following the Government’s case, Limon-Juvera sought to introduce evidence that
in proceedings before an immigration judge in 2011 he had claimed to be a United
States citizen.1 The district court denied Limon-Juvera’s request, holding that the
proposed evidence had “the potential for undue consumption of time . . . prejudice
to the Government’s case . . . [and] lack[ed] true relevance to the issue in dispute.”
“The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense” and “to put before a jury evidence that might
influence the determination of guilt.” United States v. Evans, 728 F.3d 953, 959
(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, “[d]efendants are
1
The immigration court found that Limon-Juvera had not established
citizenship.
largely free to put on whatever relevant evidence they wish in an attempt to create
reasonable doubt about an element of the offense in the mind of the jury, without
meeting any burden of production or proof.” United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez,
642 F.3d 717, 723 (9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, a criminal defendant is “entitled to
exploit weaknesses in the prosecution’s case” even when he does not have a good
faith belief in the factual validity of his defense. United States v. Hernandez-Meza,
720 F.3d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 2013).
“[B]y the statute’s plain terms, alienage is a core element of the § 1326
offense.” Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d at 722. Here, the Government’s proof on
alienage consisted solely of Limon-Juvera’s prior admissions. In barring Limon-
Juvera from introducing his previous assertion to the contrary, the district court
excluded what was effectively Limon-Juvera’s only defense to the charge. See
Evans, 728 F.3d at 965 (“A decision regarding probative value must be influenced
by the availability of other sources of evidence on the point in question.” (Quoting
United States v. Wiggan, 700 F.3d 1204, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012).)). Given our
precedents, I would hold that it was error to bar Limon-Juvera from presenting
evidence to rebut the government’s reliance on his prior admissions.
Because we have held that barring a defendant from challenging an element
of the charged crime is structural error, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
2
See United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
Evans, 728 F.3d at 966.
3