DocketNumber: No. 02-50590
Citation Numbers: 80 F. App'x 584
Judges: Fernandez, Rawlinson, Reinhardt
Filed Date: 11/4/2003
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2022
MEMORANDUM
Thomas Chang was convicted by a jury of two counts of criminal conduct: (1) importation of 94.8 kilograms of a List I chemical, pseudoephedrine, into the United States from a place outside in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 957(a)(1), 971, and 960(d)(6); and (2) knowingly facilitating the transportation of pseudoephedrine after importation, knowing that such importation had occurred contrary to law, in violation of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1484, 1485 and 18 U.S.C. § 545. Both offenses involved customs violations and were regulatory in nature.
Chang appeals, arguing that the district court erred (1) in permitting the introduction of Chang’s post-arrest statements because the statements were involuntary and proper Miranda warnings were not given; and (2) in applying the drug manufacturing guideline, § 2D1.11, instead of the regulatory offense guideline, § 2D3.1, when calculating the base offense level on Count 2. We affirm the district court with respect to the first claim. With respect to the second, we vacate and remand.
I
Chang argues that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that his post-arrest statements were not voluntarily made and should have been suppressed. The district court made a thorough record of its factual findings on this issue and concluded that the questioning occurred “according to the book,” that the agent’s testimony at the hearing was “absolutely credible,” that the Miranda warnings were given, that they were knowingly and intelligently waived, and that Chang voluntarily made a statement. Nothing in the record calls these findings into question. Further, we have upheld the use of mirandized statements at trial in much more troubling circumstances. See e.g. U.S. v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1313 (9th Cir.1995)(lapse of time of one day between the waiver of rights and questioning “was not unreasonable”); U.S. v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.2002)(statements voluntary though defendant was detained for 31 hours and was fed only once). Accordingly, we find that Chang’s confession was voluntary, and we affirm his conviction.
II
As to Chang’s sentencing claim, both parties agree that the first stop in the determination of the applicable offense
On the facts of this case, we agree with Chang. In the initial complaint, the government charged him with a violation of a manufacturing offense, § 960(d)(3). Thereafter, the government appeared to waver in its theory of the ease, issuing several superceding indictments before finally charging him with two regulatory counts involving smuggling. Section 1B1.1(1) directs the sentencing court to look to the “offense of conviction” as well as the “relevant conduct.” While it is not entirely clear what a sentencing court should do where the uncharged and relevant conduct constitutes an entirely separate and far more serious offense than the offense of conviction, we conclude that where the government has already elected to characterize the underlying crime as merely regulatory (for example, the 960(d)(6) violation in count 1), a court may not use 2T3.1(c) to direct sentencing to a guideline that is based entirely on a much more severe underlying crime (here a 960(d)(7) violation leading to 2D1.11). Here, looking to the uncharged conduct rather than the offense of conviction serves to increase by five-fold the base offense level in Chang’s case, from 6 under the regulatory guideline to 30 under the manufacturing guideline, and the applicable guideline sentence from 0-6 months,
We conclude that on the facts of this case basing a guideline sentence on an entirely different type of offense from the offense of conviction, where the former proscribes a guideline range far in excess of that applicable to the latter, is “inappropriate,” and thus contrary to the provisions of the guidelines. See, e.g., App. A, Intro. (If the specified guideline section is “inappropriate,” the sentencing court should apply the guideline “most applicable to the nature of the offense conduct charged.”); § 1B1.2(a)(instructing sentencing courts to “determine the offense guideline section ... most applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e. the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment of which defendant was convicted”)); U.S. v. Crawford, 185 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir.1999)(Typically, “relevant conduct does not come into play until the correct offense guideline has been selected” based on the offense conduct charged.). At least this is so when a guideline provision is designed to direct the sentencing court from the guideline encompassing the offense of conviction to the most appropriate, though otherwise unrelated, supplemental guideline. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. The sentence on Count 2 should be imposed in accordance with section 2D3.1 of the guidelines.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED AND REMANDED, in part.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. "Regulatory” is used here to refer to statutory and guideline provisions that punish importation in violation of the customs laws, as opposed to "manufacturing” provisions that punish manufacturing, or importation with the intent to manufacture. Cf. § 2D1 (Chapter entitled "Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, Trafficking, or Possession”) with § 2D3 (Chapter entitled "Regulatory Violations”); cf. also 21 U.S.C. § 960(d)(7) ("manufactures ... a listed chemical[.]”); § 960(d)(1)("imports or exports a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a controlled substance[.]”); § 960(d)(3)("imports
. Section 960(d)(7) penalizes a person who "knowingly or intentionally manufactures .... a listed chemical in violation of Section 959,” where § 959 prohibits the "manufacture [of a] listed chemical ... intending ... that such chemical will be unlawfully imported into the United States,” and “manufacture” includes "any packaging or repackaging.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(15).
. Although Chang was sentenced pursuant to § 2D3.1 for Count 1, he received a 15 month sentence, rather than a sentence of 0-6 months, because the court elected to depart upwards 6 levels.