DocketNumber: No. 03-55562; D.C. No. CV-02-01376-JM-LAB
Citation Numbers: 87 F. App'x 56
Filed Date: 1/30/2004
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2022
MEMORANDUM
Richard Allen Clements (“Clements”) appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Clements contends that California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to clearly established Federal law, and thus we affirm. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
1. Mandatory Presumption
Jury instructions relieving the state of the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the charged offense violate a defendant’s due process rights. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
As the Court explained in Carella, the threshold question with respect to a presumption is whether it is mandatory. Carella, 491 U.S. at 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419. A presumption is mandatory if “reasonable jurors [are] require[d] ... to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts.” Id. (citation omitted). In this case, there is no indication that the jurors were required to presume willful and wanton disregard for others if the State proved that Clements incurred three or more ‘point’ violations while fleeing from the police. Subsection (b) is merely a definition or description of what qualifies as willful and wanton conduct, rather than a mandate that the jury presume malice given a set of predicate facts. See People v. Pinkston, 112 Cal.App.4th 387, 392-93, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 (2003). The jury instructions, therefore, did not create a mandatory presumption, and thus the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to clearly established Federal law.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.