United States v. Shay Paniry

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SEP 29 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-50352
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:13-cr-00511-SJO-5
v.
SHAY PANIRY, AKA Alex Paniry, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Shay Paniry appeals his conviction and sentence following a jury trial. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in denying Paniry’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 based on
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
insufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to distribute
or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), 846. Paniry contends that there was insufficient
evidence that he agreed to participate in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, or that he
understood the scope of the conspiracy as alleged. However, there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Paniry agreed to
distribute at least five kilograms of a mixture and substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine. Paniry was involved in several of the drug transactions,
including cash deliveries and the delivery of the trap car, and he also discussed
future deliveries. Circumstantial evidence showed that Paniry interacted with co-
defendant Efrain Aispuro during the conveyance of the trap car, and Aispuro had
been told that the car contained a “load” of cocaine. Paniry knew the exact amount
of money he delivered when he paid undercover detective Manuel Carrera for the
drugs. Paniry spoke frequently on the phone with co-defendant Moshe Matsri
during the drug deals, and this extensive coordination is “strong circumstantial
proof of agreement.” United States v. Iriarte-Ortega, 113 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th
Cir. 1997) (“[A]s the degree of coordination between conspirators rises, the
likelihood that their actions were driven by an agreement increases.”).
Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt,
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based on this circumstantial evidence, that Paniry agreed to participate in the
conspiracy, and understood its objects. See United States v. Lapier, 796 F.3d 1090,
1101 (9th Cir. 2015).
2. Nor did the district court err in denying Paniry’s motion for Rule 29
acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence that he attempted to distribute at
least five kilograms of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), 846.
Paniry argues that there was no evidence he believed the trap car contained
cocaine. However, Paniry’s involvement in the conveyance of the trap car and his
interactions with Aispuro and Matsri provided sufficient circumstantial evidence
for a reasonable juror to conclude that Paniry intended to distribute at least five
kilograms of cocaine by delivering the trap car.
3. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Paniry
believed the transactions on which his conspiracy and attempt-to-distribute
convictions were based involved at least five kilograms of cocaine, for the reasons
described above.
4. The district court did not plainly err in applying a three-level
sentencing enhancement based on Paniry’s control over other participants in the
drug transactions. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The district judge could have inferred
from Paniry’s oversight of co-defendant Hector Gomez-Navarro during the cash
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drops that Paniry was acting in a supervisory role, and the court was not required
to credit Paniry’s testimony that he was merely acting as Matsri’s messenger.
Similarly, the district judge could have inferred from Paniry’s interactions with
Aispuro during the delivery of the trap car that he was supervising Aispuro. Paniry
instructed Aispuro what to tell undercover detective Ray Camuy, and at some point
took over driving the trap car himself. Accordingly, the district court’s application
of the control enhancement was not plain error.
5. The district court did not plainly err in issuing the jury instruction on
whether the quantity of cocaine involved in the drug-trafficking conspiracy
equaled or exceeded five kilograms. Paniry contends that the district judge should
have instructed the jury that Paniry was required to believe that the drugs weighed
five kilograms or more. However, the standard is not whether the defendant
believed that a certain amount of drugs was involved, but rather whether he “could
reasonably foresee that such an amount would be involved in the transactions of
which he was guilty.” United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 966–57 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1993)). Paniry also argues that the jury instruction was confusing because no
drugs actually changed hands. However, we find no authority suggesting that such
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should be the rule with respect to sting operations. The district court did not
plainly err.
6. The district court did not err in denying Paniry’s motion for a Rule 29
judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for conspiring to launder money. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a), 1956(h).
Paniry contends that there was no evidence that he agreed to participate in the
conspiracy because there was no evidence that he knew his cash deliveries were
part of a larger money-laundering transaction, or that the money being transferred
derived from drug-dealing activities. However, the degree of coordination required
to carry out the “Hawala” money-laundering transaction, paired with Paniry’s close
coordination with Matsri, who believed that the funds at issue were the proceeds of
felonious drug trafficking, was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Paniry understood the nature of the
transactions, and agreed to participate.
7. Nor did the district court err in denying Paniry’s motion for a Rule 29
judgment of acquittal based on Paniry’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence
supporting his substantive money laundering convictions. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(a)(2)(A), 1956(a)(3)(A), 1956(a)(3)(B). Paniry argues that there was no
evidence that the government represented to him that the proceeds of the
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transactions were derived from unlawful activity. However, DEA Agent Willivan
Rojas testified that he told Matsri that the money came from an international
cocaine deal, and there was adequate circumstantial evidence to infer that Paniry
understood this to be the case as well, as described above. To the extent Paniry
argues that the evidence was insufficient because the government did not directly
represent the source of the funds to him, he misreads the statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(a)(2), 1956(a)(3).
8. Paniry’s challenge to the money-laundering conspiracy jury
instruction fails because he jointly submitted the proposed instruction with the
government. See United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“When the defendant himself proposes the jury instruction he later attacks on
appeal, review is denied under the ‘invited error’ doctrine.”).
9. The district court did not plainly err in applying a two-level upward
sentencing enhancement for “sophisticated laundering.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3).
While Paniry argues that the laundering was unsophisticated because it involved
only simple cash hand-offs, the entire scheme involved multiple levels of
transactions designed to make funds represented to be derived from criminal
activity seem legitimate. See id. Thus, the district court could have concluded that
the adjustment for sophisticated laundering applied.
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10. The district court did not err in denying Paniry’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions for attempted extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. See
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Paniry argues that the government failed to present sufficient
evidence that the supposed extortion of “Vegas Chad” had some effect on interstate
commerce. However, Rojas testified that he represented to Matsri that Vegas Chad
was his cocaine customer. The intrastate trade in cocaine is “commerce over
which the United States has jurisdiction,” and an “attempt[] to affect even the
intrastate sale” of cocaine is therefore an “attempt[] to affect commerce over which
the United States has jurisdiction.” Taylor v. United States, —U.S.—, 136 S. Ct.
2074, 2080 (2016). Thus, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Paniry’s attempt to collect a debt from Vegas Chad met the
interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). To the extent Paniry claims
that the government was required to provide a different jury instruction if it wished
to convict on an “indirect effect” theory, this claim finds no basis in our precedent.
11. The district court did not plainly err in applying a one-level
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(2) on the ground that Paniry
demanded an amount exceeding $20,000 in the extortion of Vegas Chad. The
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district court could have inferred a demand from the language Paniry used in his
telephone conversation with Vegas Chad.
12. The district court did not plainly err in applying a two-level
aggravated role sentencing enhancement for Paniry’s extortion offense under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Paniry argues there was no evidence that he supervised the
two men who vandalized Vegas Chad’s Ford Mustang. On the contrary, there was
ample circumstantial evidence that he instructed the men which car to vandalize
and how to do it. Thus, it was not plain error for the district court to find that
Paniry played a managerial role in the vandalism.
AFFIRMED.
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