Kanoe Lalawai-Cruz v. Hawaiian Airlines

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 25 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KANOE LALAWAI-CRUZ, No. 09-15064
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:07-cv-00537-SPK-
BMK
v.
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES; IAM & AW MEMORANDUM *
LOCAL 1979; MICHAEL MIRANDA;
MAILE DEMELLO; CY
DUVAUCHELLE; JOHN DOES, 1 - 20,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Samuel P. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 15, 2011
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Kanoe Lalawai-Cruz appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
dismissing various claims he brought against his former employer, Hawaiian
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Airlines (“HAL”), individual employees of HAL, and the union that represented
him while he was employed by HAL, the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1979 (“IAM”). We affirm.
1. IAM did not breach its duty of fair representation. “A union breaches its
duty of fair representation when its ‘conduct toward a member of the collective
bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” Beck v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)).
Lalawai-Cruz points to no evidence that IAM acted in bad faith or that its
conduct was arbitrary or discriminatory. To the contrary, IAM advocated on
behalf of Lalawai-Cruz at the disciplinary hearing and pursued his claim through
step 3 of the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”). Moreover, Lalawai-Cruz’s contention that IAM acted arbitrarily in not
arguing at the hearing that HAL retaliated against him because he expressed
concerns about unsafe practices has no merit, because no evidence suggests that he
expressed any such concerns. See Peters v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 931 F.2d 534,
540 (9th Cir. 1991).
Lalawai-Cruz therefore has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that IAM
breached its duty of fair representation.
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2. We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing
Lalawai-Cruz’s state-law claims against HAL and the individual employee-
defendants.1
First, Lalawai-Cruz has failed to establish a triable issue of fact supporting
his claim that he was terminated in violation of the Hawaii Whistleblowers’
Protection Act (“HWPA”), Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62, or public policy, as
established in Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982). The
district court held that these state-law causes of action were preempted by the
Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), but we disagree. Because these causes of action
“involve[] rights and obligations that exist independent of the CBA,” Lalawai-
Cruz’s claim is not preempted. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S.
246, 260 (1994); see also Saridakis v. United States, 166 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir.
1999).
Nonetheless, Lalawai-Cruz points to no evidence that his termination was
retaliatory. Thus, while the district court incorrectly dismissed Lalawai-Cruz’s
retaliation claim as preempted, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the
1
Lalawai-Cruz does not contest dismissal of his claim that HAL was
negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees. Moreover, because
Lalawai-Cruz does not have a triable duty of fair representation claim against IAM,
he cannot pursue in court his breach of contract claims against HAL. See 45
U.S.C. § 153(i); Peters, 931 F.2d at 541–42.
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grounds that Lalawai-Cruz failed to advance evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact that his termination violated the HWPA or the prohibition against
employment retaliation established in Parnar. Cf. Proctor v. Vishay
Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e may affirm the
district court’s holding on any ground raised below and fairly supported by the
record.”).
Second, Lalawai-Cruz’s defamation claims were properly dismissed.
Statements made in the course of grievance-related proceedings are privileged
under the RLA and therefore cannot support Lalawai-Cruz’s defamation claim.
Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988). Lalawai-Cruz has failed to
adduce any evidence to support his contention that the named defendants made
defamatory statements about him outside the CBA proceedings.
Third, Lalawai-Cruz’s intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)
claims were properly dismissed. To the extent that Lalawai-Cruz’s IIED claims are
based on allegations that his discharge violated the procedures and criteria outlined
in the CBA, they are preempted by the RLA. See Saridakis, 166 F.3d at 1278.
Lalawai-Cruz’s IIED claims are not preempted to the extent they are based on the
alleged defamatory comments made outside the disciplinary hearing or on other
conduct unrelated to the CBA. See Tellez v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536,
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539 (9th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, Lalawai-Cruz’s IIED claims were properly
dismissed, because he has adduced no evidence to establish that the defendants
committed any independent intentional conduct that was “beyond all bounds of
decency.” See Calleon v. Miyagi, 876 P.2d 1278, 1288, 1289 n.7 (Haw. 1994)
(quoting Chedester v. Stecker, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (Haw. 1982)).
Finally, Lalawai-Cruz’s conspiracy claims were also properly dismissed.
These claims are preempted to the extent the acts underlying his conspiracy claims
are the same as those underlying his other preempted claims—for instance, that the
defendants conspired to breach the CBA. Hyles, 849 F.2d at 1217. Lalawai-
Cruz’s conspiracy claims are not preempted to the extent they are based on the
same actions that underlie his non-preempted state-law claims. Id. But, under
Hawaiian law, because Lalawai-Cruz’s other claims cannot survive summary
judgment, his conspiracy claims fail as well. See, e.g., Robert’s Hawaii Sch. Bus v.
Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., 982 P.2d 853, 889 n.44 (Haw. 1999); Ellis v. Crockett,
451 P.2d 814, 822–23 (Haw. 1969).
AFFIRMED.
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