Brandon Campbell v. Vitran Express, Inc.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 09 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRANDON CAMPBELL; and RALPH No. 12-56250
MALDONADO, individually and on
behalf of members of the general public D.C. No. 2:11-cv-05029-RGK-SH
similarly situated, and as aggrieved
employees pursuant to the Private
Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
VITRAN EXPRESS, INC., a Pennsylvania
corporation, fka Vitran Express West, Inc.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 3, 2014
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, GRABER, Circuit Judge, and ZOUHARY,**
District Judge.
Plaintiffs Brandon Campbell and Ralph Maldonado, representing a certified
class of drivers employed by Defendant Vitran Express, Inc., a motor carrier,
appeal from a judgment dismissing their claims under California’s meal and rest
break laws, California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512, and 8 California Code of
Regulations § 11090. Following Dilts v. Penske Logistics LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d
1109, 1119–20 (S.D. Cal. 2011), the district court held that those state laws as
applied to motor carriers are preempted under the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA") and granted judgment on the pleadings for
Defendant. Reviewing de novo the interpretation and construction of the FAAAA,
Tillison v. Gregoire, 424 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005), and a judgment on the
pleadings, Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2010), we reverse.
In Dilts v. Penske Logistics LLC, No. 12-55705, decided this date, we hold
that California’s meal and rest break laws are not meaningfully "related to" prices,
routes, or services and therefore are not preempted under the FAAAA. See 49
U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Those are the same state laws that are at issue here.
**
The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
2
In light of our holding in Dilts, the district court erred by granting judgment
on the pleadings to Defendant on a theory of FAAAA preemption. We therefore
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with Dilts.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
3