Mack West, Jr. v. Randy Grounds

FILED
JAN 10 2018
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MACK A. WEST, Jr., No. 16-16795
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-03147-JKS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RANDY GROUNDS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: LUCERO, ** RAWLINSON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Mack A. West, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. He contends
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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that his due process rights were violated when the trial court declined to
conduct a fourth competency hearing after his mental health deteriorated
and he attempted suicide. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
we affirm.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), federal habeas relief is available only if a state court’s
decision “(1) was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’
or (2) ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Torres v. Prunty,
223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). A state
trial court’s determination that a competency hearing is not required is a
finding of fact entitled to deference unless it is objectively unreasonable.
Id. at 1105.
A defendant has the right under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to not be tried or convicted while he is incompetent
to stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 385 (1966). A
competent defendant must have “sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a
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rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
A trial judge must conduct a competency hearing sua sponte “[o]nly
when ‘the evidence raises a bona fide doubt’ about the defendant’s
competence to stand trial.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th Cir.
2004) (quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 385). A bona fide doubt is raised when “a
reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to
conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced
doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” de Kaplany v. Enomoto,
540 F.2d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). The standard is one of
substantial evidence. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510
(9th Cir. 1994) (“A good faith doubt about a defendant’s competence arises
if there is substantial evidence of incompetence.” (quoting United States v.
Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1993))).
There is no “general standard with respect to the nature or quantum of
evidence necessary” to trigger a competency hearing. Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). Rather, the assessment is one in which “the trial
judge must evaluate all the evidence and evaluate the probative value of
each piece of evidence in light of the others.” Chavez v. United States, 656
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F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981). “‘[E]vidence of a defendant’s irrational
behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on
competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further
inquiry is required,’ and ‘one of these factors standing alone may, in some
circumstances, be sufficient.’” Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 568 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180). Although a suicide attempt
can give rise to a bona fide doubt as to competence, it does not necessarily
do so. See United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1318-19
(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that not “every suicide attempt inevitably
creates a doubt concerning the defendant’s competency”).
We hold that the trial court’s denial of a fourth competency hearing
did not rest on a clearly unreasonable analysis of the facts in light of the
evidence. West was evaluated dozens of times, by at least four
psychologists, over the course of more than five years. Multiple evaluators
documented strong suspicions that he was exaggerating his symptoms to
delay trial. Based on the contents of his prior medical evaluations, a
reasonable judge could have concluded that West was feigning
incompetence to delay the proceedings.
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It is certainly true that the suicide attempts that occurred shortly
before West’s request for a fourth competency hearing were appropriate to
consider in determining whether an additional competency hearing was
required. Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 571. The trial court judge did consider the
attempts in his analysis. Suicide attempts do not, however, necessitate a
bona fide doubt as to competence, and given the medical history in the
record and West’s behavior at trial, it was not clearly unreasonable for the
trial court judge to find no such doubt in this case.
AFFIRMED.
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