Joseph Streepy v. Andrew Saul

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 11 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH SCOTT STREEPY, No. 19-15628
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02435-EFB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Edmund F. Brennan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: LUCERO,*** W. FLETCHER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Joseph Streepy appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Commissioner of Social Security. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Substantial evidence supports the finding of the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) that Streepy has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light
work, because several examining and reviewing doctors concluded that Streepy
could perform at least light work, and no doctor determined that Streepy had
functional impairments preventing him from performing such work. See
Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s finding
that Streepy can perform the past relevant work of an insurance agent is also
supported by substantial evidence. A vocational expert testified that a person with
Streepy’s characteristics and RFC can perform that work, see Biestek v. Berryhill,
139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (2019), and for purposes of a disability determination, the
obsolescence of Streepy’s skills in the insurance business does not prevent him
from performing that work, see Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that “atrophy of skills does not prevent one from performing past work
for disability purposes”); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The ALJ properly followed the relevant regulations in determining that
Streepy’s mental impairments were nonsevere, and substantial evidence supports
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that finding, including reports of Streepy’s daily activities, as well as medical
reports and lay-person testimony. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a; Keyser v. Comm’r,
648 F.3d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 2011).
The ALJ did not err by giving little weight to statements from Streepy’s
wife, because the ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting her testimony, which
was inconsistent with the medical evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).
Nor did the ALJ err by failing to develop the record. Streepy did not support
his claim that there are missing psychiatric records, and the record before the ALJ
was sufficient for proper evaluation of the evidence. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276
F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001).
Finally, the ALJ did not err by finding that Streepy’s testimony about the
severity of his symptoms was inconsistent with the medical records. The ALJ
performed the correct two-step process for determining whether the evidence
supports a claimant’s subjective testimony. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,
1014 (9th Cir. 2014).
AFFIRMED.
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