sellpoolsuppliesonline.com LLC v. Ugly Pools Arizona, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 31 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SELLPOOLSUPPLIESONLINE.COM, No. 18-16839
LLC,
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01856-BSB
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
UGLY POOLS ARIZONA, INC.; BRIAN
MORRIS,
Defendants-Appellees.
SELLPOOLSUPPLIESONLINE.COM, No. 19-15714
LLC,
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01856-JZB
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UGLY POOLS ARIZONA, INC.; BRIAN
MORRIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Zachary Boyle, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 5, 2020
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, OWENS, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated cases arise from a copyright infringement suit brought
by SellPoolSuppliesOnline.com LLC (“Plaintiff”) against Ugly Pools Arizona, Inc.
and its owner, Brian Morris (collectively, “Defendants”). In No. 18-16839,
Plaintiff appeals from the district court orders granting summary judgment to
Defendants on the copyright infringement and the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”) claims. In No. 19-15714, Defendants appeal from the district
court’s order denying their request for attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in both cases.
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See L.A. Printex
Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012). We review a
district court’s decision on attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. See Gold
Value Int’l Textile, Inc. v. Sanctuary Clothing, LLC, 925 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir.
2019).
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants
on the copyright infringement claim. We agree with the district court that
Plaintiff’s certificate of registration was invalid because (1) there is no genuine
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dispute over whether Plaintiff knowingly included inaccurate information on its
application by falsely representing that the deposit material accompanying its
application depicted the website as it appeared on the purported publication date of
July 3, 2014; and (2) the Register of Copyrights told the court that it would have
refused registration had it known about the inaccurate information. Because
Plaintiff’s certificate of registration was invalid, Plaintiff failed to satisfy the
registration precondition under 17 U.S.C. § 411 to bring a copyright infringement
claim.
Plaintiff’s argument that the publication date it provided with its application
was not false because it only sought to register certain photos and text that were
published on July 3, 2014 is unsupported by the record. And because the record
supports that Plaintiff sought to register content on its website as depicted in the
deposit, we are also unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s contention that the question posed
to the Register of Copyrights was misleading. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are
foreclosed by binding precedent. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-
Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2019); Gold Value, 925 F.3d at 1147.
2. The district court correctly determined that Plaintiff’s claim for the
improper removal of copyright management information (“CMI”) under the
DMCA fails because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants removed any of
Plaintiff’s CMI. Under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b), it is unlawful to intentionally remove
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CMI without the authority of the copyright owner. As relevant here, CMI is
defined as information conveyed in connection with a work that identifies the
owner, author, or title of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c). The information
allegedly removed by Defendants did not identify Plaintiff as the owner or author
of any content on the website. Indeed, Plaintiff admitted that the information was
a fictitious name. The fictitious name also did not identify the title of Plaintiff’s
website, “SPSO Website www.poolandspapartsnow.com.” Thus, the information
that Defendants allegedly removed was not Plaintiff’s CMI.
3. The district court properly determined that Plaintiff’s false CMI claim
under the DMCA fails because Defendants’ copyright notice was not “conveyed in
connection with copies” of Plaintiff’s work. In analyzing Plaintiff’s false CMI
claim, the district court properly limited the work to Plaintiff’s photos. Upon de
novo review, we further find that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff’s work
includes only the photos with the “©CVP” marking.
Under the DMCA, it is unlawful to knowingly provide false CMI with the
intent to conceal infringement, and CMI is defined as certain information
“conveyed in connection with copies . . . of a work.” 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
Defendants’ copyright notice did not meet the definition of CMI because it was not
“conveyed in connection with” Plaintiff’s photos. Based on the following
undisputed facts, Defendants’ copyright notice did not suggest that it was
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associated with or linked to Plaintiff’s photos: Defendants’ copyright notice was
located at the bottom of the webpage in a shaded box, separating it from the rest of
the content on the webpage; Defendants’ notice was generic and did not
communicate that Defendants owned the photos; Defendants’ notice was not
located on or next to Plaintiff’s photos; and Plaintiff’s photos were imprinted with
their own copyright markings.1
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’
motion for attorneys’ fees under § 505 of the Copyright Act. That section gives
discretion to district courts to “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing
party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. In denying Defendants’ request, the district court
considered several factors, but Defendants only challenge the district court’s
analysis of two factors—whether an award would advance the goals of the
Copyright Act and the objective reasonableness of Plaintiff’s position. See Perfect
10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Ets-Hokin v.
Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Given the limited arguments that Defendants made below to show that an
award would advance the goals of the Copyright Act, we cannot find that the
district court abused its discretion in analyzing this factor. We also cannot find
1
We note that, even if this last fact were subject to genuine dispute, we
would still agree with the district court that Defendants’ copyright notice was not
“conveyed in connection” with Plaintiff’s photos given the other undisputed facts.
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that the district court abused its discretion in analyzing the objective
reasonableness factor. Defendants contend that the district court failed to consider
all unreasonable positions taken by Plaintiff throughout the litigation. The district
court’s order, however, shows that it did consider Plaintiff’s positions throughout
the litigation. The order recounts Plaintiff’s conduct throughout the litigation and
states that “Plaintiff advanced several unpersuasive arguments in this litigation.”
Though the court found Plaintiff’s arguments unpersuasive, it ultimately concluded
that they were not objectively unreasonable. Thus, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
No. 18-16839: AFFIRM.
No. 19-15714: AFFIRM.
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