Yihong Jin v. William Barr

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YIHONG JIN, No. 18-72750
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-266-237
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 4, 2020**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: FARRIS, McKEOWN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
YiHong Jin (“Jin”), a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of
removal. Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014). We review
denials of asylum and withholding of removal for substantial evidence, id., and we
deny the petition.
I.
Jin claims persecution on account of her Christian religion. In May 2010,
police arrested Jin as she was leaving a Christian house church service. She was
detained overnight at the police station and interrogated. During the questioning,
one of the officers struck Jin on her arms and shoulders with his baton. Jin
suffered bruises but did not require medical care. Before Jin’s release, her father
paid a fine of 2,000 yuan. Jin was also forced to sign a guarantee letter agreeing
that she would not attend any house church gatherings and would report regularly
to the police.
II.
Jin argues that her “arrest, detention, assault, and release conditions” show
that she experienced past persecution and is entitled to relief under asylum. The
totality of the evidence does not compel a finding of past persecution, see
Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998), and Jin has not established
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Jin failed to challenge the IJ’s denial of CAT protection in her appeal to the
BIA. Therefore, the BIA determined that she had waived her claim to protection
under CAT. Jin does not challenge that determination in this appeal.
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a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Jin’s detention, interrogation, and beating closely mirror that suffered by the
petitioner in Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2006), where the court
concluded “that the evidence [did] not compel a result contrary to the BIA’s.” Id.
at 1021. While Jin’s statement in her brief is correct that the court has “explicitly
rejected the implication . . . that persecution stems from the severity of the
beating,” incidents suffered by petitioners are considered under the totality of the
circumstances standard. See, e.g., Gu, 454 F.3d at 1020–21. The BIA recognized
that Jin’s detention and beating were “harsh” but concluded that they did “not rise
to the level of persecution.” This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
See Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1995).
In addition, unlike the petitioner in Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir.
2018), Jin failed to carry her burden to show that she cannot practice her religion.
The conditions of her release forbade her from attending church services at an
unregistered house church. However, her sole reason for not wanting to attend a
state-sponsored church is not applicable to the autonomous Korean Christian
Churches she admits she could attend. Thus, substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that Jin failed to carry her burden to show that she was
unable to practice her religion. See Singh v INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
Jin also failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, which
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must be subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See Montecino v. INS,
915 F.2d 518, 520–21 (9th Cir. 1990). The objective prong is established by
“adducing credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would
support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191
(9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). Jin has not shown that her fear was
objectively reasonable with credible, direct, and specific evidence. Thus,
substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision denying Jin asylum relief.
III.
To qualify for withholding of removal, Jin must establish that it is “more
likely than not” that her life or freedom would be threatened on account of her
Christian religion. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 429–30 (1984). This
“clear probability standard is more stringent than the well-founded fear standard
for asylum.” Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation
omitted). Because Jin has not carried her burden to show a well-founded fear of
future persecution, she cannot establish the higher clear probability standard
required for withholding of removal. Thus, the agency’s denial of Jin’s application
for withholding of removal is supported by substantial evidence and we deny her
petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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