Garabed Mirzoian v. Michel El-Rahi

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARABED O. MIRZOIAN, No. 19-16589
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00024
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHEL N. EL-RAHI; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
Ramona V. Manglona, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Garabed O. Mirzoian appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his employment action alleging wrongful termination in violation of
federal law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mirzoian’s action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies because Mirzoian’s employment was terminated in 2006
and Mirzoian did not file a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) until 2015. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (a
charge must be made with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice or within 300 days if a charge is first made with an
authorized state agency). Although Mirzoian filed a discrimination complaint with
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Department of Labor
(“DOL”) within 18 days of the termination of his employment, the DOL had no
worksharing agreement with the EEOC, and therefore Mirzoian’s DOL complaint
would not be considered timely filed with the EEOC. See Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel
& Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a charge filed
with an agency that has a worksharing agreement with the EEOC is deemed to
have been received by the EEOC on the same day).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply equitable
tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (equitable tolling
applies when a litigant shows: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way”); Coppinger-
Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[O]nce a claimant retains
2 19-16589
counsel, tolling ceases because she has gained the means of knowledge of her
rights and can be charged with constructive knowledge of the law’s requirements.”
(citation omitted)); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting
forth standard of review).
Mirzoian’s motion for disqualification of the district court judge (Docket
Entry No. 5) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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