United States v. Omar Menera-Arzata

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-50283
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:15-cr-00212-BEN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
OMAR MENERA-ARZATA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Omar Menera-Arzata appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 36-month custodial sentence and 3-year term of supervised release
imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in
the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Menera-Arzata contends that the district court procedurally erred by (1)
factoring irrelevant asylum issues into its sentencing analysis and (2) relying on
clearly erroneous facts, namely that Menera-Arzata’s alcoholism continued to
present a threat to the public. We review for plain error, see United States v.
Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. The
record reflects that the district court considered only appropriate sentencing factors
and did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts. See United States v. Carty, 520
F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Menera-Arzata next contends that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances,
including Menera-Arzata’s criminal and immigration history. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the term of supervised release as an added measure of
deterrence. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n. 5; United States v. Valdavinos-Torres,
704 F.3d 679, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED.
2 15-50283