United States v. Cheng Jin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-10065
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:19-cr-00015-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHENG JIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
Ramona V. Manglona, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2020**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Cheng Jin appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming his bench-
trial conviction before a magistrate judge for violating 41 C.F.R. § 102–74.385.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jin challenges the evidence presented during the bench trial. Specifically, he
claims that on the day of his arrest he was not being disruptive, not blocking the
entryway to the Immigration Customs Law Enforcement, Enforcement and
Removal Operations (“ICRO”) Office, and that he had a legitimate right to be
there. We review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a bench trial de
novo. See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that Federal Protective
Services Inspector Sean White clearly directed Jin to leave the property or face
arrest, and that Jin intentionally defied that order by remaining on the property and
refusing to leave. Indeed, Jin admits that he knew he would be arrested if he failed
to comply with the order, but willfully disobeyed the order because he disagreed
with the reasoning for his removal. This evidence is sufficient to support Jin’s
conviction for failing to comply with a lawful direction of federal police officers
and other authorized individuals under 41 C.F.R. § 102–74.385. See United States
v. Bichsel, 395 F.3d 1053, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2005).
To the extent Jin also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, we do not consider that claim in this direct appeal. See United States v.
Steele, 733 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2013).
AFFIRMED.
2 20-10065