Mary Strong v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 22 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARY STRONG, No. 19-35544
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. Nos. 6:16-cv-00233-MC
6:16-cv-00331-MC
v.
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.; et MEMORANDUM*
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2020**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Mary Strong appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her diversity action alleging foreclosure-related claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading
& Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Stratagem Capital, LLC and Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A., because
Strong failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
foreclosure sale on the junior loan was not conducted by a duly authorized trustee.
See Or. Rev. Stat. § 86.797(1) (providing that “[i]f, under [the provisions of the
Oregon Trust Deed Act], a trustee sells property covered by a trust deed, the
trustee’s sale forecloses and terminates the interest in the property that belongs to a
person to which notice of the sale was given”); Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d
1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing limited circumstances under which a
borrower’s post-sale challenge is not barred by Or. Rev. Stat. § 86.797(1)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Bank of America, N.A., Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., on the
basis of the doctrine of issue preclusion, because Strong’s claims challenging the
authority of these defendants to foreclose under the senior loan were actively
litigated in a previous state court judicial foreclosure proceeding that resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. See Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2007) (federal courts apply state law regarding the preclusive effect of state
2 19-35544
court judgments); Berg v. Benton, 443 P.3d 714, 717 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (elements
of issue preclusion under Oregon law). To the extent Strong alleges errors by the
state court during the judicial foreclosure proceedings, her claims are barred under
the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because they constitute a “de facto appeal” of the
state court’s judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003)
(the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see
also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto
appeal is one in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the
state ruling” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-35544