Enedelia Perez Madriz v. William Barr

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 30 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ENEDELIA PEREZ MADRIZ; MARIA No. 17-72576
SALUD PEDRIZCO PEREZ; ENEDELIA
PEDRIZCO PEREZ; MARIA LUISA Agency Nos. A206-498-590
PEDRIZCO PEREZ; JUAN PEDRO A206-498-591
PEDRIZCO PEREZ; OLGA NATIVIDAD A206-498-592
PEDRIZCO PEREZ; ESBEYDE A206-498-593
YARELE PEDRIZCO PEREZ; ISABEL A206-498-594
GUADALUPE PEDRIZCO PEREZ, A206-498-595
A206-498-596
Petitioners, A206-498-597
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 28, 2020**
Before: GRABER, TALLMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Lead petitioner, Enedelia Perez Madriz, and her seven children, natives and
citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order
dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We
review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence.
Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2018). “Substantial evidence
review means that we may only reverse the agency’s determination where ‘the
evidence compels a contrary conclusion from that adopted by the BIA.’” Id. at
908–09 (quoting Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010)). We deny
the petition for review.
1. Perez Madriz’s jurisdictional argument is foreclosed by Karingithi v.
Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1106
(2020).
2. The BIA did not err in adopting and affirming the IJ’s denial of asylum
and withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1208.16. Substantial
evidence supports the agency’s determination that Perez Madriz did not establish
past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her
membership in a particular social group or any other protected basis. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A).
2
Substantial evidence supports the determination that Perez Madriz is not a
member of the proposed social group “family members of murder victims who
made reports to the police,” where she did not testify that she reported the murders
of her brother or brother-in-law to the police. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225
F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that whether an individual is a
member of a proposed social group is a question of fact), overruled on other
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), vacated,
547 U.S. 183 (2006).
Substantial evidence also supports the determination that Perez Madriz’s
membership in the proposed social groups “family members of murder victims”
and “family members of murdered police officers” lacks a nexus to her past or
feared persecution in Mexico. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84
(1992) (recognizing that whether such a nexus exists is a factual question).
Although cartel members threatened Perez Madriz and her family members at
gunpoint, the record does not suggest that this incident was motivated by their
family’s relationship to a brother-in-law who cartel members allegedly murdered
years before. See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Assuming that Petitioner’s family is ‘a particular social group’ within the
meaning of the statute, he has not established that he was persecuted ‘on account
3
of’ his family membership.”). There is also no evidence that Perez Madriz or her
family members have received threats or suffered physical harm in connection with
the murder of her brother, a police officer.
The conclusion that Perez Madriz failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of a protected ground is likewise supported by
substantial evidence. Although we acknowledge Perez Madriz’s fears of cartel
violence, the record does not compel the conclusion that she faces a heightened
risk of harm due to protected characteristics. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from . . . random violence by
gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”); Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d
859, 865 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Asylum generally is not available to victims of civil
strife, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground.”). Because
Perez Madriz did not make the showing required for asylum, she also did not meet
the more stringent “clear probability” standard that governs withholding of
removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
3. The issue of CAT relief is not before us where the BIA did not adjudicate
Perez Madriz’s CAT claim, cf. Parada, 902 F.3d at 914 & 914 n.12, but adopted
and affirmed only the portion of the IJ’s decision denying asylum and withholding
of removal. Because Perez Madriz did not raise any meaningful challenge to the
4
IJ’s denial of CAT relief in her appeal to the BIA, the BIA did not err in holding
that the issue was waived. See, e.g., Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (9th
Cir. 2019).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
5