Royland Rice v. El Cerrito Police Department

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 30 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROY’LAND RICE, No. 14-15963
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5-11-cv-06295-EJD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EL CERRITO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ET AL,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 15, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, and EZRA,**
District Judge.
Roy’land Rice appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
arising out of the impounding of his vehicle for expired registration tags. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, and may affirm on any
ground supported by the record. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 860
n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rice’s procedural
due process claims because Rice failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in the
impounded vehicle. See Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1128
(9th Cir. 2001) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due
process applies when a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest is at
stake.”); see also Scofield v. City of Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 762–65 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that pre-tow notice and hearing are not required before impounding
a vehicle with expired registration). On the record before us, it is impossible to
determine what interest, if any, Rice had in the vehicle. What is certain is that he
was neither its registered nor its legal owner under California law. Further, Seidell
Enterprises did provide actual notice to Rice’s last associated address.
To the extent it was properly raised, dismissal of Rice’s Fourth Amendment
claim was proper because Rice failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the
search and seizure were unlawful. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
-2-
364, 368–69 (1976); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1477, n.4
(9th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rice’s motion to
join Seidell Enterprises, Inc., as a defendant. See Clement v. City of Glendale,
518 F.3d 1090, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2008) (private towing company entitled to “good
faith” defense because authorized by police department and constitutional
defect/lack of notice could not have been known at time).
AFFIRMED.
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