Brandy Bobo v. Andrew Saul

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRANDY R. BOBO, No. 19-35048
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05020-MAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: IKUTA and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER,*** District Judge.
Brandy Bobo appeals the determination of an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”)—which was affirmed by a federal district court—that she is not disabled
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
because she has residual functional capacity to work. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and will not overturn an ALJ’s decision “unless it is either not
supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v.
Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). Finding no reversible errors here, we
affirm the district court’s determination.
1. The ALJ did not err in his evaluation of the relevant medical
evidence. Ms. Bobo raises a litany of errors. Having considered all of them, we
conclude that the ALJ did not err in his assessment of the opinions and findings of
Dr. Elrod, Dr. Losee, Dr. Barton-Haas, Dr. Kedar, or in his weighing of the
opinions and findings of non-examining medical professionals. We also conclude
that even if the ALJ erred in not addressing the opinions and findings of Tyre
Patterson and Rosemary Spyhalsky, or in not stating on the record that the opinions
of non-examining medical professionals were based on incomplete information,
any errors were harmless because they were “inconsequential to the ultimate
nondisability determination” and would not “alter[] the outcome of the case.”
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2. The ALJ did not err in giving only some weight to Ms. Bobo’s
symptom testimony. The ALJ gave several “clear and convincing” reasons for
doing so, including that Ms. Bobo’s testimony about dizziness and debilitating pain
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was not consistent with the medical evidence, that medications and therapy had
been relatively effective in controlling her neck pain, headaches, fibromyalgia, and
mental health symptoms, that her daily activities were not as limited as one might
expect based on Ms. Bobo’s symptom testimony, and that she made inconsistent
statements in her testimony. Substantial evidence supports each of the reasons
given by the ALJ.
3. The ALJ did not err in giving only some weight to Ms. Bobo’s
mother’s testimony. The ALJ gave a “germane” reason for doing so—that it was
inconsistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence supports that
decision. The mother testified that Ms. Bobo had severe social anxiety, could not
manage stress and interact socially, had difficulty using her arms, and could not
stand for long periods of time, among other things. This testimony was
inconsistent with medical evidence that Ms. Bobo could in fact walk and stand, had
normal range of motion and strength in her shoulders, and could in fact manage
work-related stress and social interactions. Because a “reasonable mind might
accept” this evidence as “adequate to support” the conclusion that the mother’s
testimony was inconsistent with the medical evidence and therefore entitled to only
some weight, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Biestek v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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4. The ALJ did not err in determining Ms. Bobo’s residual functional
capacity. Instead, the ALJ based his determination on the limitations he found to
be credible and supported by substantial evidence. Because we conclude that the
ALJ properly assessed the evidence and that substantial evidence supports his
conclusions, we also conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity determination.
AFFIRMED.
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