United States v. Benjamin MacIas

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 29 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10054
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:15-cr-00125-GEB-1
v.
BENJAMIN MACIAS,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 15, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: BERZON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE,*** Senior District
Judge.
Benjamin Macias appeals his conviction and sentence for drug and firearms
charges based on a series of cocaine transactions between December 2014 and July
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
This appeal is ordered submitted on the briefs as of April 15, 2020,
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
2015. We review a possible violation of the Sixth Amendment de novo, United
States v. Myers, 930 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2019), and the admission of
evidence for abuse of discretion and prejudicial error, United States v. Carpenter,
923 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2019). We review for abuse of discretion both
the application of a sentencing enhancement and the dismissal of a juror after
deliberations have commenced. United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170
(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 806 (9th Cir.
2015). We deny Macias’s appeal and affirm the district court’s rulings.
1. Macias’s argument that only he had the authority to waive time for
purposes of a constitutionally speedy trial is unavailing. Macias rests his argument
on an analogy to McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). Distinguishing
decisions reserved for the client from those which are the lawyer’s province,
McCoy noted that trial management is generally controlled by counsel. Id. at 1508.
As counsel’s trial management authority applies to scheduling matters, including
agreements to delay trial, New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000), Macias’s
analogy to McCoy is inapposite.
This court has evaluated constitutional speedy trial claims under the
framework laid out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), even where a
defendant disagreed with his counsel’s trial scheduling decisions, United States v.
Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2001). As Macias made no argument to this
2
court under the Barker framework, and in fact specifically disclaimed the
applicability of the framework, we do not reach any such analysis.
2. Any error in admitting evidence of drug sales by Macias for which he
was not charged under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence was harmless.
See Carpenter, 923 F.3d at 1182-83. As Macias acknowledges, the government’s
case against him was overwhelming even excluding this evidence.
3. The court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror #6 after
deliberations began because Juror No. 6 was discharged for good cause and there is
no reasonable possibility that the dismissal was based on the juror’s views of the
merits. See United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court made two findings that were supported by the record and were
valid grounds for dismissing Juror No. 6.
First, the court held that Juror No. 6 was not credible in claiming he had
safety concerns, because the record showed that Juror No. 6 “was trying to figure
out how to get off this case” even before jury deliberations began, and failed to
communicate his alleged safety concerns to the judge before deliberations despite
receiving instructions about how to do so. A court’s determination that a juror
“was untruthful with the court and untrustworthy” is a valid basis for discharging a
juror, and “[w]e afford special deference to a trial court’s adverse credibility
finding because the determination of credibility is largely one of demeanor.”
3
Christensen, 828 F.3d at 808 (quotation omitted).
Second, the court held that Juror No. 6 refused to participate in deliberations
for reasons other than his views on the merits. The record also supports this
finding, because the juror stated that he had been “[t]rying to figure out how to get
excused” from the jury well before jury deliberations commenced, that he knew he
wanted to be excused as soon as he entered the jury room, and that he was not
willing to engage in deliberations. This is another valid basis for excusing the
juror; we “generally defer to the district court’s good cause determinations because
the district court is in the best position to evaluate the jury’s ability to deliberate.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
We reject the argument that there was “any reasonable possibility that the
impetus” for Juror No. 6’s dismissal stemmed from his views on the merits of the
case.” Id. at 807. As noted above, Juror No. 6 emphasized that he had decided he
needed to be excused from the case well before jury deliberations began, and the
court could reasonably disbelieve his single statement that he felt “he was being
forced to give a different opinion in the room.” We have previously upheld the
dismissal of a juror who claimed that other jurors wanted to remove him because
of his views on the merits, because the court reasonably concluded that the juror
was not credible and there were other reasons for the dismissal. Id. at 811-12.
Moreover, Juror No.6 raised his concerns to the court just 95 minutes into
4
deliberations, which we have held indicates that he was not motivated by any
disagreement on the merits with other jurors. See id. at 811 (describing it as
“highly unlikely” that complaints about a juror were motivated by a disagreement
on the merits when the issue was raised a “little more than an hour after
deliberations began,” which is “very early in the process”).
In these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
questioning Juror No.6 or other jurors further. Because the court had sufficient
grounds to dismiss Juror No.6, additional questioning was not required. Id. at 808.
While a more intrusive inquiry may be justified where the trial court had no
grounds for dismissing the juror other than the juror’s request for dismissal, see
United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006), such an inquiry is not
required, and is generally discouraged, see Christensen, 828 F.3d at 808 (“A court
may not delve deeply into a juror’s motivations because it may not intrude on the
secrecy of the jury’s deliberations.”) (quotation omitted). We should avoid
substituting our reasonable choices over the trial judge’s rational decisions on
credibility and process. We therefore defer to the court’s considered decision not
to probe further than necessary and uphold its determination to dismiss the juror
for good cause.
4. The district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement for reckless
endangerment during flight. Macias fled the scene of the drug transaction where
5
law enforcement agents were present and sped at up to 90 miles per hour on the
highway, weaving between cars, confirming that he was trying to get away from
law enforcement. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding both that Macias
engaged in flight from law enforcement and that his conduct was reckless. See
United States v. Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d 1481, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1997).
Macias’s appeal is DENIED.
6
FILED
United States v. Macias, No. 19-10054
APR 29 2020
BERZON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in Parts 1 through 3 of the memorandum disposition, but
respectfully dissent from Part 4. I would grant Macias’s appeal based on the
district court’s dismissal of a juror without adequate inquiry into the juror’s
reasons for requesting dismissal, where the juror’s responses to the court’s
questions indicated a reasonable possibility that his request for dismissal was based
on his views of the merits of the case.
The court dismissed the juror after finding that he refused to deliberate and
that he was not credible. A court’s dismissal of a juror after deliberations have
commenced is improper if there is a reasonable possibility that the request for
dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case. United States v.
Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, a juror informed the court
of his discomfort and nervousness regarding his jury service. In response to a
question about why he did not want to be a juror, the juror stated that he felt
pressured to “give a different opinion” in the jury room. Under these
circumstances, the district court should have acceded to defense counsel’s
request—after a lengthy colloquy—to ask the juror a further question regarding
any improper behavior by the other members of the jury, just as the district court
did in United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2006). Decoud held
1
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a juror in part
because the court, in recalling the juror to answer an additional question regarding
the other jurors’ behavior, ensured there was no reasonable possibility that the
juror harbored a reason for discharge other than her stated concerns. Id. at 1017.
The majority is correct that district courts “may not intrude on the secrecy
of the jury’s deliberations,” United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 811 (9th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086), but misinterprets this instruction
to suggest that district courts are generally discouraged from asking questions
about the behavior of the other members of the jury when they already have
grounds to dismiss a juror. Although “necessarily constrained” by the mandate to
avoid intruding into the jury’s deliberations, a court may “rightly instruct[] each
juror questioned not to volunteer information beyond what the court asked and not
to discuss the content of deliberations or any juror’s views on the merits.” Id.The district court in Decoud had sufficient grounds to dismiss a juror based
on her religious views after an initial round of questioning. The juror had not
indicated any pressure from other jurors, but the court still recalled the juror to ask
one further question, to eliminate the reasonable possibility that the request for
dismissal stemmed from the juror’s views of the merits. 456 F.3d at 1003-05,
1017. The court did not err in asking the additional question about any
“improprieties by the other jurors,” but rather “took care in inquiring into the
2
circumstances that gave rise to the juror’s request for discharge” and “ma[de] sure
that there was no reasonable possibility that the juror harbored some other reason
for discharge, such as her views on the merits of the case.” Id. at 1017.
The court’s adverse credibility finding cannot be sustained on the current
record. It appears to stem from the juror’s failure to inform the court, prior to the
commencement of deliberations, of his concerns regarding the proximity of his
home to the location of one drug transaction. Yet the court ascertained that the
juror was not in fact concerned about his safety. Had there been further inquiry,
what was really bothering the juror could well have been explained. As the juror
said, until he walked into the jury room, he did not fully appreciate the fact of
being a juror, and he then felt pressured to agree with his peers. The question the
court should have asked is why he felt that pressure.
For these reasons, I would grant the appeal.
3