Brian Salonen v. Jackson Natl. Life Insurance

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 6 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN SALONEN, No. 19-35584
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 9:18-cv-00119-DWM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 4, 2020**
Portland, Oregon
Before: SCHROEDER, WATFORD, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Brian Salonen appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
Jackson National Life Insurance Co. The district court ruled that the Jackson’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
letters to Salonen’s clients, mistakenly stating that Salonen was no longer available
to service their products, did not constitute libel per se. We affirm.
Under Montana state law, a statement constitutes libel per se if it is “of such
a nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that [it] will tend to disgrace
and degrade [an individual] or cause him to be shunned and avoided.” Wainman v.
Bowler, 576 P.2d 268, 271 (Mont. 1978). Libel “include[s] whatever tends to . . .
blacken [an individual’s] reputation, or imputes fraud, dishonesty or other moral
turpitude, or reflects shame, or tends to put him without the pale of social
intercourse.” Manley v. Harer, 235 P. 757, 759 (Mont. 1925). A statement is not
libel per se if it merely tends to annoy or embarrass an individual. Wainman, 576
P.2d at 271.
Salonen argues that the letters constitute libel per se because they caused his
clients and other members of the community to believe he was terminated for
misconduct, and therefore damaged him in his occupation. The letters, however,
are capable of non-libelous meanings, including that Salonen and Jackson mutually
agreed to end their business relationship. The letters thus did not constitute libel
per se. See id. at 271 (“The language used must be susceptible of but one meaning,
and that an opprobrious one.”). The district court therefore correctly granted
summary judgment to Jackson.
AFFIRMED.
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