Bank of New York Mellon v. Scott Stafne

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 8 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, a New No. 16-36032
York banking corporation,
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00077-TSZ
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SCOTT ERIK STAFNE, an individual;
MAYUMI OHATA STAFNE, in her
capacity as the personal representative of the
estate of Todd Stafne,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 3, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and CALDWELL,***
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Karen K. Caldwell, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
Scott Stafne and the Estate of Todd Stafne appeal the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”) in a judicial
foreclosure action. The parties are familiar with the facts and we do not repeat
them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s determination of subject matter
jurisdiction. U.S. ex rel. Solis v. Millennium Pharm., Inc., 885 F.3d 623, 625 (9th
Cir. 2018). The district court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Stafne challenges
BNYM counsel’s ability to bring the case, but far from having “no relationship at
all” to their clients, Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 131 (2004), the district
court found any suggestion that BNYM’s attorneys did not actually represent
BNYM to be so lacking in merit as to be frivolous. The same description applies
to Stafne’s argument that a missing definite article in “Bank of New York Mellon”
renders the litigant fictitious, depriving the court of jurisdiction. His argument that
the senior district judge who heard his case was a “retired judge” merely “acting as
an Article III judge in this case,” is without merit. Senior judges “are, of course,
life-tenured Article III judges.” Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 72 (2003).
Stafne has waived his argument as to party substitution by failing to raise it
in his opening brief, see In Re J.T. Thorpe, Inc., 870 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.
2017), and did not preserve his argument regarding the timing of the sale of his
loan to BNYM by failing to raise it in opposition to summary judgment, Shakur v.
2
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Branch
Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2017). The
quitclaim deed to Todd Stafne, executed after the deed of trust, could not stave off
foreclosure, as it was subject to BNYM’s lien on the property. A quitclaim deed
conveys “only the grantor’s interest, subject to valid title claims and
encumbrances.” United States v. Spahi, 177 F.3d 748, 751–52 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing Thorstad v. Fed. Way Water & Sewer Dist., 870 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1994)). The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment
to BNYM, and in doing so rightly dismissed Appellants’ counterclaims. The
Estate of Todd Stafne’s reliance on a separate state court case relating to the
property’s boundaries, notwithstanding its issuance after the district court’s
judgment in this case, is unavailing, and Appellants’ other arguments are without
merit.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Appellant’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Findings of Fact and Stipulated
Conclusions of Law (Dkt. 64) and Appellant’s Motion for Miscellaneous Relief
(Dkt. 93) are denied.
3