Emanuel Finch, Sr. v. K. Whitehead

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 30 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EMANUEL L. FINCH, Sr., No. 19-35961
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05675-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
K. RICHARD WHITEHEAD;
DEPARTMENT OF ASSIGNED
COUNSEL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 26, 2020**
Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Emanuel L. Finch, Sr. appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lukovsky v. City &
County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Finch’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1985, and 1986, and state law claims, because Finch failed to file these
claims within the applicable statutes of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (one-
year statute of limitations); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (three-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions); Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d
926, 930 (9th Cir. 1987) (absent a federal statute of limitations, Civil Rights Act
claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
actions); see also Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th
Cir. 1991) (a claim accrues when the plaintiff first learns of the injury giving rise
to the claim).
The district court properly dismissed Finch’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on these
claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and
Finch failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction had been
invalidated. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (a prisoner in state
custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his
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confinement but must instead seek federal habeas corpus relief). The dismissal of
these claims as Heck-barred should be without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of
Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissals under Heck are without
prejudice). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of these claims, but remand to
the district court with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect that the
dismissal of these claims is without prejudice.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Finch’s state law
claims rather than remanding his state law claims to state court. See Satey v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that the district court has discretion to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even if the federal law claims are
dismissed).
We reject as unsupported by the record Finch’s contentions that the district
court was biased, deprived him of his constitutional rights, and conspired with
defendants.
Finch’s motion for dismissal (Docket Entry No. 19) is denied.
The Clerk will provide Finch with a courtesy copy of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
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AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions to amend the judgment.
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