Tammy Hepburn v. Teleperformance

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
NOV 2 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAMMY H. HEPBURN, No. 19-17053
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00151-BGM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TELEPERFORMANCE, Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Bruce G. Macdonald, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **
Submitted October 26, 2020***
Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Tammy H. Hepburn appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her Title VII employment action alleging race discrimination, hostile
work environment, and retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112
(9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hepburn’s
disparate treatment claim because Hepburn failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Teleperformance’s proffered non-discriminatory,
legitimate reasons for any adverse employment actions, including changing
Hepburn’s job duties and work location, were pretextual. See Aragon v. Republic
Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
elements of and burden-shifting framework for a discrimination claim under Title
VII; explaining that evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); see also
Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Conclusory
statements without factual support are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hepburn’s hostile
work environment claim because Hepburn failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant failed to take adequate remedial and
disciplinary action in response to a non-supervisory employee’s use of offensive
racial slurs or any other alleged conduct. See McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112, 1119-
20.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hepburn’s
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retaliation claim because Hepburn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether there was a causal relationship between any protected activity and a
materially adverse employment action. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349
F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of Title VII retaliation claim
and explaining what constitutes an adverse employment action).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hepburn’s motion
for default judgment as a discovery sanction because defendant did not violate a
court order, and the district court was within its discretion in finding that
defendant’s actions did not warrant the extreme sanction of entry of a default
judgment. See Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.
1991) (setting forth standard of review).
We reject as unsupported by the record Hepburn’s arguments that the district
court erred by failing to consider Hepburn’s allegations of harassment, failing to
acknowledge that racial slurs are offensive, and considering the affidavits of
Reinartz and Bay.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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