Gregory Moore v. County of Orange

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 16 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GREGORY MOORE, individually, and on No. 18-55042
behalf of J.M.,
D.C. No. 8:13-cv-01346-JLS-AN
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF ORANGE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 9, 2020**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Gregory Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the placement of his child J.M. into foster
care. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s action as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because Moore has previously litigated the same claim in a
California state court proceeding against the same parties or their privies. See
Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir.
2005) (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment federal courts
look to state law. . . . California’s res judicata doctrine is based on a primary rights
theory.” (citation omitted)); In re Estate of Dito, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 286 (Ct.
App. 2011) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, all claims based on the same cause
of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be
raised at a later date.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Contrary to Moore’s contention that res judicata does not apply because
defendants obtained their state court judgment through extrinsic fraud, Moore
failed to allege plausibly how he was prevented from presenting his claims in state
court. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting
forth what constitutes extrinsic fraud).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore leave to
amend his complaint because any amendment would have been futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend may be denied
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where amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moore’s post-
judgment motion for reconsideration because Moore failed to demonstrate any
basis for relief from the judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60).
We reject as without merit Moore’s contentions that the district court erred
in denying Moore a continuance for oral argument regarding defendants’ motion to
dismiss and in lifting the stay on the district court’s proceedings.
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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