Craig Slavin v. Rebecca Monet

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 5 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CRAIG S. SLAVIN, No. 20-55549
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:19-cv-01786-JM-MDD
v.
REBECCA MONET; LAURENCE F. MEMORANDUM*
HAINES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 3, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, TALLMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Craig Slavin appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. The district court correctly determined that Slavin failed to state a
claim for malicious prosecution under California law because the defendants in this
matter had probable cause to pursue their libel claim against Slavin in the prior
proceedings. See Roberts v. McAfee, 660 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting
that the second element of a California malicious prosecution claim is that the prior
proceedings were brought without probable cause). “Probable cause is present
unless any reasonable attorney would agree that the action is totally and
completely without merit.” Roberts v. Sentry Life Ins., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408, 412
(Ct. App. 1999) (citation and emphasis in original omitted). That some of the
factual allegations in the prior libel complaint were later disproved does not vitiate
the probable cause to continue the claim supported by the other factual allegations
in the prior complaint. Slavin’s argument to the contrary is not supported by the
legal authority to which he cites.
2. The district court properly determined that Slavin failed to adequately
allege the malice element of a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant
Haines. To state a California malicious prosecution claim, “[t]he plaintiff must
plead and prove actual ill will or some improper ulterior motive,” ranging
“anywhere from open hostility to indifference.” Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co.,
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 151 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations and emphasis in original
omitted). Although Slavin’s complaint alleges Monet demonstrated malice by
2
filing the libel suit to harass Slavin and gain an unfair business advantage over
him, it fails to specifically allege Haines’ ill will or other improper motive.
AFFIRMED.
3