Liaosheng Zhang v. Honeywell International, Inc.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 11 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LIAOSHENG ZHANG, Nos. 09-17395,
10-16235
Plaintiff - Appellant,
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01181-MHM
v.
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., MEMORANDUM *
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Mary H. Murguia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
In these companion appeals, Liaosheng Zhang appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment and orders awarding costs and attorney’s fees in
her employment action under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Act (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.
2004). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s award of costs and
attorney’s fees. Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006);
EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1993). We may affirm on any
ground supported by the record, Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d
802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
Summary judgment was proper on Zhang’s race, sex, and national origin
discrimination and retaliation claims because Zhang failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Honeywell’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for terminating and not rehiring her were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349
F.3d at 640-42, 646.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Zhang’s age
discrimination claim because Zhang failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether her age was the “but-for” cause of her termination or failure to
be rehired. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Zhang’s disability
discrimination claim because Zhang failed raise a genuine dispute of material fact
2 09-17395
as to whether she was “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. Sanders v.
Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting definition of
“disability” under the ADA and holding that the plaintiff’s temporary impairment
was of insufficient duration to constitute a “disability”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding taxable costs to
Honeywell as the prevailing party. See Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1070 (“Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), there is a presumption that the prevailing party will
be awarded its taxable costs.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding partial attorney’s
fees to Honeywell on the basis of its determination that Zhang’s action was
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
Zhang’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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