Pieter Jayasaputra v. William Barr

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PIETER EKA JAYASAPUTRA, No. 17-70643
Petitioner, Agency No. A098-456-296
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 12, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Pieter Eka Jayasaputra, a Chinese Christian native and citizen of
Indonesia, filed an affirmative application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture. After a merits hearing, the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Jayasaputra’s application. The Board of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ’s decision. Nearly two years after the
BIA’s decision, Jayasaputra filed a motion to reopen his case, arguing that country
conditions in Indonesia had materially changed such that Indonesian Christians
faced an increased risk of violence from Islamist extremists. The BIA denied
Jayasaputra’s motion. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny
Jayasaputra’s petition.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.
Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017). The BIA abuses its
discretion when its denial is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id. (quoting
Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Motions to reopen are generally untimely if filed more than 90 days after the
final administrative decision is rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).1 However,
the 90-day deadline is excused where the motion to reopen is “based on changed
circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which
deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available
and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To determine whether there exists a material change in
circumstances warranting the reopening of an alien’s case, the BIA compares “the
1
It is undisputed that Jayasaputra’s motion to reopen was untimely.
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country conditions at the time of the . . . motion [to reopen] [with] those at the time
of the prior hearing.” Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2016).
Here, Jayasaputra submitted evidence that at most demonstrated that
religious-based violence against Christians in Indonesia had persisted since his
merits hearing, not that such violence had materially increased. This is insufficient
to satisfy a petitioner’s burden of proof on a motion to reopen based on changed
country conditions. See Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1204 (“The newly submitted
evidence must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the
previous hearing. Evidence that simply recounts previous conditions presented at a
previous hearing or that is voluminous but redundant is not sufficient to show a
change in country conditions.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, the BIA’s decision
to deny Jayasaputra’s motion to reopen was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to
law.
Contrary to what Jayasaputra argues, the BIA also did not err in failing to
address whether Jayasaputra had a prima facie claim for relief. Having concluded,
as an independently dispositive matter, that Jayasaputra had failed to establish
materially changed country conditions to excuse his untimely motion to reopen, the
BIA was not required to reach the issue of whether Jayasaputra had a prima facie
claim for relief. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Because the Board denied [petitioner’s] motion to reopen based on her failure to
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introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, it did not need to reach the
question of whether [petitioner] established a prima facie case for relief.”).
Accordingly, the BIA properly denied Jayasaputra’s motion to reopen.
DENIED.
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