Douglas Scheitlin v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 10 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS G. SCHEITLIN, an No. 10-16347
individual,
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02342-FJM
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM *
FREESCALE SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2011 **
San Francisco, California
Before: TROTT and BEA, Circuit Judges, and PALLMEYER, District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Northern Illinois, sitting by designation.
Douglas Scheitlin appeals the district court’s dismissal on summary
judgment of his claim that he was terminated by Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
(“Freescale”) in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”). As the facts and procedural history are familiar to the parties, we do
not recite them here except as necessary to explain our decision. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047
(9th Cir. 2009). We affirm the decision of the district court.
Under the ADEA, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that “age was the
‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employment action.” Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009). The district court
properly concluded that Scheitlin failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in
either his age discrimination or retaliation claim.
As the district court recognized, nothing in the record supports Scheitlin’s
assertion that the employee selected to replace him was unqualified to assume his
position. Scheitlin’s “subjective personal judgments of [his] competence alone do
not raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104
F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996).
2
The comments made by Freescale’s Chief Executive Officer at a meeting
eight months prior to Scheitlin’s termination were stray remarks unrelated to the
challenged adverse actions and “are insufficient to establish discrimination.”
Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990). Nor does a
manager’s truthful acknowledgment that Scheitlin’s replacement was younger and
less experienced constitute evidence that age was the reason Scheitlin was chosen
for redeployment.
None of the remaining evidence suffices to create a genuine dispute as to
whether Freescale’s legitimate rationale for selecting Scheitlin for redeployment
and then terminating him was “internally consistent or otherwise not believable.”
Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks
omitted).
AFFIRMED.
3