Felix Martinez v. L. Scribner

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 12 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FELIX CRUZ MARTINEZ, No. 09-16438
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:06-cv-00656-AWI
v.
MEMORANDUM *
L. E. SCRIBNER, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2010 **
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Felix Cruz Martinez appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying
his federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We agree with the district court that the California courts’ resolution of
Martinez’s claim that coerced statements were improperly admitted at trial was not
“contrary to, or [ ] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” and did not “result in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Specifically, the California Court of Appeal’s determination that admission
of the first statement was harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18(1967), because the jury could not have given any weight to the first statement, was
reasonable in light of the jury’s factual findings and the substance of first
statement. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2004).
Also, the California Court of Appeals reasonably determined that the second
statement was not tainted by the first interview, in light of the time that elapsed
between the interviews of the witness, the less confrontational manner in which the
second interview was conducted, and the substance of the second statement. See
Garvin v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, admission of the first statement did not have a substantial and
injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22
(2007) (“[I]n § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of
2 09-16438
constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and
injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht [v. Abrahamson], 507 U.S. 619[1993], whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it
for harmlessness . . . .”).
AFFIRMED.
3 09-16438