Napoleon Perea, II v. Commissioner Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NAPOLEON PEREA, II, No. 12-16243
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02237-CMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Craig Kellison, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2014**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON, District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Napolean Perea II appeals the Eastern District of California’s affirmance of
the denial of his application for supplemental security income.
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not commit reversible error. The
ALJ properly evaluated Appellant’s credibility and determined that the many
inconsistencies in his statements and testimony undermined his assertions
concerning his ailments’ severity. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680–81
(9th Cir. 2005). Because the same reasons undermine Appellant’s mother’s Third-
Party Function Report, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to
address it. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). The
ALJ also properly discounted the opinions of examining physicians Dr. Wakefield
and Dr. Kalman because they were inconsistent with Appellant’s stated daily
activities. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ
did not ignore Dr. Conte’s and Dr. DeSouza’s opinions and properly accepted them
and included their limitations in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2008). The
hypothetical individual the ALJ posed to the vocational expert (“VE”) properly
included all the limitations the ALJ included in Appellant’s RFC. See Magallanes
v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989). Finally, there is no evidence that
the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”), so the ALJ’s failure to ask whether the VE’s testimony was consistent
with the DOT was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
AFFIRMED.