Emmanuel Roy v. Pioneer Human Services

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 22 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EMMANUEL ROY, No. 20-36079
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00235-RMP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PIONEER HUMAN SERVICES;
SPOKANE RESIDENTIAL REENTRY
CENTER; DAN SIGLER; CARLOS
SOLORZA; SUSAN JOHNSON-
CONNORS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 22, 2022 **
Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Emmanuel Roy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment and its
order denying remand of his action against Pioneer Human Services, Spokane
Residential Reentry Center, Dan Sigler, Carlos Solorza, and Susan
Johnson-Connors (hereafter “defendants”) to the Spokane County Superior Court
in the State of Washington. The district court determined that it had federal
question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We reverse and
remand.
Roy’s cause of action for “Damages for Breach of Statutory Duty” is a state
law tort claim. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 192 P.3d 886, 889 (Wash.
2008); Est. of Templeton ex rel. Templeton v. Daffern, 990 P.2d 968, 972 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2000). While the cause of action involves a federal issue because its
resolution requires consideration of whether 18 U.S.C. § 3624 imposed a duty on
defendants and whether defendants breached that duty, the federal issue does not
meet the requirements for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over a state
law claim. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065, 185 L.
Ed. 2d 72 (2013); Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, __ F.4th __, __,
No. 20-56194, 2022 WL 518989 at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2022). The federal issue
is “necessarily raised” and “actually disputed,” but it is not “substantial” or
“capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance
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approved by Congress.” See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258, 133 S. Ct. at 1065; Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 683, 700–01, 126 S. Ct.
2121, 2127, 2137, 165 L. Ed. 2d 131 (2006).
The face of Roy’s complaint showed that he was asserting state law claims
for “Damages for Retaliation” and “Damages for Failure to Train & Supervise -
Respondeat Superior,” not 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. See Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987);
Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
While Roy’s cause of action was entitled “Retaliation,” he alleged the elements of
negligence. See Ranger Ins. Co., 192 P.3d at 889. Additionally, he alleged causes
of action under Washington law for respondeat superior and negligent training and
supervision. See Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 860 P.2d 1054, 1056–57 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (respondeat superior); Evans v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 380 P.3d
553, 564 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (negligent training and supervision).
Because there was no federal question jurisdiction based on Roy’s causes of
action for breach of statutory duty, retaliation, or respondeat superior, the district
court did not have supplemental jurisdiction over Roy’s remaining state law
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claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The judgment is REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the district
court with instructions to remand the case to the Spokane County Superior Court in
the State of Washington.
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