Susan Canavan v. Kilolo Kijakazi

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN MARGARET CANAVAN, No. 21-55521
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-08235-VEB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Victor E. Bianchini, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District
Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Margaret Canavan challenges the denial of her
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
application for Social Security disability benefits. Applying the deferential
substantial evidence standard of review required by our precedent, see Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005), we affirm the district court’s decision
in this case and uphold the denial of benefits.
Canavan suffers from numerous medical issues. When she applied for Social
Security disability benefits, her application was denied based on a finding that she
was not disabled. Canavan’s request for reconsideration of this denial was rejected
on the same basis. She then asked for and received a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ reviewed Canavan’s medical records and
heard testimony from Canavan and a vocational expert. Following the hearing, the
ALJ issued a 15-page, single-spaced decision recognizing that Canavan has
legitimate medical issues, but finding she can work in some jobs with the right
limitations and concluding that she does not fall within Social Security’s definition
of “disabled.”
Canavan then began the appeals process: after the Social Security Appeals
Council denied her request for review, she filed this lawsuit. The district court
affirmed the denial of benefits and Canavan timely appealed to this court.
We review a district court’s order affirming an ALJ’s denial of benefits de
novo. Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. In contrast, the ALJ’s underlying denial is subject to
a “highly deferential standard of review.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
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574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). We may only overturn the ALJ’s decision to
deny benefits if that decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is based
on legal error. Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.
On appeal, Canavan argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of
Dr. Mark Smith, who is Canavan’s primary care physician, as well as Norma
Avina, a nurse practitioner working for Dr. Smith, as to limitations on Canavan’s
neck and ability to manipulate or lift.1
Applying the substantial evidence standard, we must reject Canavan’s
argument. The record shows that the ALJ rejected some of Dr. Smith’s opinions
because the ALJ found that they were not persuasive in light of contrary findings
from six other doctors and Canavan’s longitudinal clinical record. The exhaustive
review of medical records reflected in the ALJ’s written decision refutes
Canavan’s assertion that the ALJ mischaracterized or overlooked records
supporting Canavan’s position. Canavan essentially asks for the evidence to be
reweighed in a manner more favorable to her. But “[w]here evidence is susceptible
to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be
upheld.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. This is consistent with the principle that we must
1
Canavan initially asserted a second argument regarding the constitutional
authority underlying the denial of benefits, but filed an unopposed motion to
withdraw that argument. We grant that motion, and thus do not consider this
argument or Canavan’s proffered justifications for withdrawing it.
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“defer[] to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” Biestek v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1157 (2019). “On judicial review, an ALJ’s factual
findings . . . ‘shall be conclusive’ if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Id. at
1153 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Canavan has not shown that the ALJ’s decision
was not supported by substantial evidence.
The district court is AFFIRMED.
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