United States v. Byron Prince

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 24 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30212
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00110-TOR-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BYRON CORNELIUS PRINCE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 26, 2014
Seattle, Washington
Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Byron Prince appeals from his conviction for being a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the judgment of the district court.1 In a separate opinion
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1
The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will not recount them
here.
issued concurrently, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Prince’s prior
conviction for attempted robbery in California was a “violent felony” under the
Armed Career Criminal Act.
I. Extrinsic Evidence
Allowing the jurors to handle a gun and holster introduced during the trial
did not constitute the introduction of extrinsic evidence. A jury may carefully
examine all evidence presented at trial. See United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921,
926–27 (9th Cir. 1994). Even if this was extrinsic evidence, its introduction did
not create a reasonable possibility of a different verdict. See Rincon, 28 F.3d at
926. The evidence against Prince was strong and the defense’s own theory of the
case assumed the gun fit into the holster. Further, the government presented
uncontroverted testimony that the gun fit into the holster, and the jury could likely
see that the gun and holster fit together. The district court did not err by allowing
the jurors to examine and handle the gun and holster.
II. Improper Jury Deliberations
Prince’s allegation of juror misconduct is unsupported. No evidence shows
that the jurors “engaged in private deliberations” in the courtroom. Even if the
jurors had engaged in improper discussions as they passed the gun and holster
among themselves, Prince cannot demonstrate that any misconduct prejudiced him
2
“to the extent that he [did] not receive[] a fair trial.” See Anderson v. Calderon,
232 F.3d 1053, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394,
396 (9th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other
grounds by Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002). There was
strong evidence of Prince’s guilt, and, accepting the declaration from Prince’s
counsel as true, the jurors’ communications lasted no more than a few minutes.
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment of conviction.
3