United States v. Christin Didier

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 24 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30233
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 9:12-cr-00036-DWM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHRISTIN DIANNE DIDIER,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 17, 2014
Portland, Oregon
Before: CLIFTON, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
A jury found Christin Didier guilty of seven counts of mail fraud and one count
of conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The government appeals the district court’s order
granting Didier’s motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Criminal Procedure 29 and its alternative order granting a conditional new trial. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and reverse and remand.
1. We review the grant of a judgment of acquittal de novo, United States v.
Young, 458 F.3d 998, 1004 n.13 (9th Cir. 2006), and ask “whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
2. The district court erred in concluding that no rational trier of fact could have
found Didier’s misrepresentations material. The insurance policy required the carrier
to pay for the “reasonable increase” in Didier’s living expenses resulting from a
“covered loss.” Didier misrepresented that she had incurred an increase in her living
expenses by virtue of the covered loss. This was “capable of influencing” the carrier’s
decision to pay her pursuant to the policy. United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882, 888
(9th Cir. 2008). Even if the amount of expenses claimed would have been reasonable
had Didier actually incurred them, the policy requirement of an “increase” made
Didier’s misrepresentations material.
3. The district court erred in alternatively granting Didier a conditional new
trial because Didier never moved for a new trial. A district court may not grant a
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conditional new trial sua sponte. See United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 605
(9th Cir. 2012).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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