United States v. Samuel Hughes

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50304
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:20-cr-00332-DSF-1
v.
SAMUEL TRELAWNEY HUGHES, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and KOH, Circuit Judges, and MCMAHON,*** District
Judge.
Samuel Trelawney Hughes appeals his convictions for stalking, witness
tampering, and making interstate threats. Hughes contends that the district court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Colleen McMahon, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
failed to ensure the voluntariness of his guilty pleas as required by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(b)(2) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
As the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not recite them here.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Because Hughes failed to object below, we review for plain error. See
United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.4th 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2021). “In conducting the
plain-error analysis, we are ‘not restricted to the record of the plea colloquy.’” Id.
at 1146 (quoting United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008)).
1. The district court did not plainly err under Rule 11(b)(2). Before
accepting a guilty plea, Rule 11(b)(2) requires the district court to “determine that
the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than
promises in a plea agreement).” Relying on United States v. Fuentes-Galvez, 969
F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2020), Hughes argues that the district court did not adequately
ensure his guilty plea was voluntary.
However, unlike in Fuentes-Galvez, the district court addressed Hughes’s
“competence to enter the plea,” id. at 916, by making sufficient “inquiries as to
whether [Hughes] was capable of knowingly and voluntarily entering a plea” at the
plea hearing, id. at 915. In response to the district court’s inquiries, Hughes stated
that he took medication for depression, to which the district court followed up by
asking for the name of the medication, how long he had been taking it, and the last
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time he had taken it. Hughes denied that his medication affected his ability to
understand what others say to him, noting that the medication in fact helped him
understand his feelings and make better decisions. After Hughes indicated having
a condition that affects his communications and interactions, without explicit
mention of his autism spectrum disorder, and being drowsy, the district court asked
if Hughes wanted to proceed with his pleas. Hughes answered affirmatively.
Then, the district court reiterated that Hughes could stop the hearing at any time if
he did not understand something, needed to consult with his counsel, or no longer
wished to plead guilty. Underscoring that the district court wanted to ensure that
Hughes understood the hearing and that Hughes understood he was not required to
proceed with the hearing, the district court again asked Hughes if there was any
reason why the hearing should not go forward. Hughes confirmed there was no
such reason.
In addition, the district court told Hughes numerous times that Hughes need
not plead guilty if he did not want to do so. Moreover, throughout the hearing, the
district court repeatedly asked Hughes if he understood the hearing and his pleas.
Hughes confirmed that he discussed the plea agreement with his counsel, did not
need any additional time to discuss the agreement, and understood its terms.
Hughes also confirmed that he understood both the proceedings and the
consequences of pleading guilty, and denied there being any reason why the
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district court should not accept his pleas. When the district court asked if Hughes
was pleading guilty voluntarily and was competent to plead guilty, Hughes
answered affirmatively each time.
“To reverse the judgment of conviction on this record, we would have to
presume that [Hughes] did not understand the court’s questions when he testified
under oath that he did.” United States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688, 704 (9th Cir.
2000) (rejecting Rule 11 claim by defendant with mental and physical
impairments). In concluding that Hughes was competent to plead guilty, the
district court properly “rel[ied] on [Hughes’s] answers to [its] inquiries as well as
[its] observations of [Hughes] during the hearing.” United States v. Carter, 795
F.3d 947, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d
1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that substantial weight is given to
defendant’s in-court statements in assessing voluntariness).
The record also reflects that Hughes asked questions when he did not
understand something or needed clarification, and the district court properly
responded by offering an explanation, allowing his counsel to explain, or providing
time for him to consult his counsel. See Timbana, 222 F.3d at 702 (“The record
shows that, whenever [defendant] raised a question concerning the effect of a
guilty plea . . ., the district court explained the concept, or what was happening in
terms [defendant] could understand.”).
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Further unlike Fuentes-Galvez, the district court repeatedly confirmed with
Hughes’s counsel that Hughes was competent and was pleading guilty voluntarily.
See 969 F.3d at 915 (observing that the magistrate judge “did not ask defense
counsel whether he thought [defendant] was pleading knowingly and voluntarily”).
Having recently discussed the plea hearing with Hughes, Hughes’s counsel denied
there being any reason Hughes should not proceed with his pleas, representing that
Hughes wanted to plead guilty and was competent to do so. While recognizing
that Hughes’s autism spectrum disorder contributed to his conduct, Hughes’s
counsel explained that “[t]here are no competency issues and he was not legally
insane or incompetent or anything like that.” Additionally, Hughes’s counsel
affirmed her belief that Hughes was entering his pleas voluntarily and intelligently,
and agreed that the district court complied with Rule 11.
“The fact that [Hughes’s] attorney apparently considered him competent is
significant evidence that he was competent.” United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180,
186 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir.
2011) (“Trial counsel’s assurances to the court are relevant because ‘a defendant’s
counsel is in the best position to evaluate a client’s comprehension of the
proceedings.’” (quoting Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1991))).
In response to the district court’s questions, Hughes also confirmed that he
was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, had sufficient time to discuss the
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case with her, and believed that his counsel had fully advised him. See Fuentes-
Galvez, 969 F.3d at 915 (noting that “the magistrate judge did not ask [defendant]
whether he understood his attorney or felt fully satisfied with the counsel,
representation, and advice given to him by his attorney”).
Finally, the record further shows that Hughes “admitted guilt and expressed
remorse” at sentencing, and “[a]t no point did he say he wanted to change his plea
or suggest his plea was involuntary.” Ferguson, 8 F.4th at 1147. Rather, Hughes
“affirmed that he was pleading guilty because he committed the charged crimes.”
Id.
Even assuming Hughes showed a Rule 11(b)(2) error, it was not plain. On
this record, we cannot say that such an error would be “‘so clear-cut’” and “‘so
obvious’” under our case law that “‘a competent district judge should [have] be[en]
able to avoid it without benefit of objection.’” United States v. Zalapa, 509 F.3d
1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1002
(9th Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Gonzalez Becerra, 784 F.3d 514, 518
(9th Cir. 2015) (“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current law.”
(citation omitted)). 1
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In light of our conclusion, “it is unnecessary to consider” the remaining prongs of
plain error review. Gonzalez Becerra, 784 F.3d at 518.
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2. Nor did the district court plainly err under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. “[I]f a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and
knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.”
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969). Hughes relies on the same
grounds underlying his Rule 11 claim. For the reasons discussed above, the record
contains “some affirmative evidence that [Hughes] entered his plea knowingly and
willfully.” United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2011).
Indeed, the plea hearing transcript “contains several indicators that [Hughes]
indeed entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily,” id. at 657–58, as he was
“represented by, and able to consult with, experienced defense counsel,” id. at 658,
was “expressly advised of all relevant rights and consequences of [his] guilty
pleas,” id., and “had the opportunity to voice any confusion audibly during the
many times that [the district court] asked [him] whether [he] understood what [the
district court] had described,” id. at 658 n.5.
AFFIRMED.
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