Rukhsana Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 19 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUKHSANA CHAUDHRY; No. 11-55820
MOHAMMAD AFZAL CHAUDHRY;
USMA CHAUDHRY; MOHAMMAD D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01592-RGK-RZ
UMAR CHAUDHRY; ESTATE OF
MOHAMMAD USMAN CHAUDHRY;
ISLAMIC SHURA COUNCIL OF MEMORANDUM*
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
And
INTERFAITH COMMUNITIES UNITED
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; JOSEPH
CRUZ; DAVID ROMO; COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES
COUNTY CORONER DEPARTMENT;
ANTHONY HERNANDEZ;
LAKSHMANAN
SATHYAVAGISWARAN,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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Defendants - Appellees,
And
LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT; WILLIAM BRATTON,
Defendants.
RUKHSANA CHAUDHRY; No. 11-55906
MOHAMMAD AFZAL CHAUDHRY;
USMA CHAUDHRY; MOHAMMAD D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01592-RGK-RZ
UMAR CHAUDHRY; ESTATE OF
MOHAMMAD USMAN CHAUDHRY;
ISLAMIC SHURA COUNCIL OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
And
INTERFAITH COMMUNITIES UNITED
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant - Appellant,
And
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JOSEPH CRUZ; DAVID ROMO;
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS
ANGELES COUNTY CORONER
DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY
HERNANDEZ; LAKSHMANAN
SATHYAVAGISWARAN; LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT;
WILLIAM BRATTON,
Defendants.
RUKHSANA CHAUDHRY; No. 11-55907
MOHAMMAD AFZAL CHAUDHRY;
USMA CHAUDHRY; MOHAMMAD D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01592-RGK-RZ
UMAR CHAUDHRY; ESTATE OF
MOHAMMAD USMAN CHAUDHRY;
ISLAMIC SHURA COUNCIL OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
And
INTERFAITH COMMUNITIES UNITED
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH CRUZ,
Defendant - Appellant,
And
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CITY OF LOS ANGELES; DAVID
ROMO; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;
LOS ANGELES COUNTY CORONER
DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY
HERNANDEZ; LAKSHMANAN
SATHYAVAGISWARAN; LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT;
WILLIAM BRATTON,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 6, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, M. SMITH, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
On March 25, 2008, Los Angeles Police Officer Joseph Cruz shot and killed
Mohammad Usman Chaudhry (“Usman”). Usman’s estate, his parents (“the
Chaudhrys”), and his siblings (“the Siblings”), brought a number of claims against
Cruz and various other defendants connected with the City and County of Los
Angeles. Eventually, some of the estate’s and the Chaudhrys’ claims against Cruz
and the City went to trial. Before trial, the district court disposed of the plaintiffs’
other claims in favor of the various defendants.
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This appeal presents many issues, a number of which we address in a
published opinion filed concurrently with this memorandum disposition. In this
memorandum disposition, we address issues not addressed in our opinion.
A. Federal Constitutional Claims
1. Substantive Due Process. The Chaudhrys were not sufficiently deprived
of their interest in the “possess[ion], control, [and] dispos[ition]” of Usman’s
remains, Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796 (9th Cir. 2002), to
support a substantive due process claim. California law creates a right to
possession of a body for burial, but it does not create a right to burial on whatever
terms the family desires. Parents have no right to stop a coroner from performing
an autopsy, id. at 798 n.15, from removing organs, Perryman v. Cnty. of L.A., 63
Cal. Rptr. 3d 732, 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), or even from handling the body in a
disrespectful or undignified manner, id. (citing Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d
1445, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996)). Usman’s decayed condition and the delay in burial,
while tragic for the Chaudhrys, did not deprive them of any constitutionally
protected property right.
2. Equal Protection. Summary judgment was proper on plaintiffs’ equal
protection claims because there is no evidence that any defendant acted with the
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intent to discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of their race or religion. See
Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
3. Free Exercise. There is no genuine dispute that the Los Angeles Coroner
Department’s policies for locating decedents’ families are generally applied and
neutral with respect to religion. Therefore, the district court properly held that the
policies’ incidental effect on plaintiffs’ religious beliefs did not violate their right
to free exercise of religion. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
4. Conspiracy. Summary judgment was proper on plaintiffs’ conspiracy
claims because they introduced no “specific facts to show any agreement” among
the defendants to violate their rights. Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d
1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989).
5. Monell Liability and Failure to Train. In their opening brief, plaintiffs
limit their claims for Monell liability, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978), and failure to train, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989),
to the County of Los Angeles’s failure to provide timely notification of Usman’s
death. Because plaintiffs have not shown that the County’s conduct violated the
Constitution, summary judgment was proper on their Monell and failure-to-train
claims.
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B. State-Law Claims
1. California Civil Code § 51.5. The district court properly granted
summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs’ § 51.5 claim because, as with
their equal protection claim, they have not provided evidence of discrimination.
2. California Constitution. In their opening brief, the Chaudhrys and the
Siblings did not “specifically and distinctly” argue how they properly alleged
violations of the California Constitution, so they have waived those claims. Kim v.
Kang, 154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1998). To the extent their state constitutional
claims depend on their claims under the United States Constitution, the state claims
fail for the same reasons those federal claims fail.
3. Conversion. The defendants are all immune from plaintiffs’ claims for
conversion. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2(b), 821.6. The Los Angeles Police
Department collected and retained Usman’s property as part of its investigation
into the shooting. Therefore, the City defendants are immune. See Blankenhorn v.
City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 488 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 821.6 immunity
extends to all “actions taken in preparation for formal proceedings, including
actions incidental to the investigation of crimes” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Cnty. of L.A. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 239 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009). The County defendants also retained Usman’s property as part of the
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investigation into Usman’s death, so they too are immune. See Stearns v. Cnty. of
L.A., 79 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
To the extent plaintiffs rely on pre-investigation conduct, that conduct was
not conversion. Conversion requires “an assumption of control or ownership over
the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to his own use.”
Hartford Fin. Corp. v. Burns, 158 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). Police
officers moving Usman’s property was not conversion. See Simonian v. Patterson,
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“The simple act of moving
items . . . [does] not constitute a conversion of those items.”). Cruz shooting
Usman also was not an exercise of ownership or dominion over Usman’s property.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Summary judgment was
proper on the Chaudhrys’ IIED claim because there is no evidence that any
defendant acted “with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 820
P.2d 181, 202 (Cal. 1991).
C. Shura’s Standing
Shura argues that it has standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of its
members because its members “reside in Los Angeles County, and must—at some
point—die. They will likely die in Los Angeles County and be served by
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Coroner.” That is too speculative to constitute an “injury in fact” for standing
purposes. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). Because
Shura has not identified any individual member to whom the County’s policies
“threaten[] imminent and concrete harm,” it lacks standing. Id. at 495; see also
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
Conclusion
We affirm the district court on all issues addressed in this memorandum
disposition. For the reasons stated in our opinion, published concurrently with this
memorandum disposition, we affirm in part and reverse in part on the issues
addressed in the opinion, and we remand to the district court for further
proceedings. Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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