Ricardo Ramirez-Marentes v. Stuart Ryan

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 26 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO RAMIREZ-MARENTES, No. 10-56191
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:05-cv-00551-GHK-
CW
v.
STUART RYAN, Acting Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 3, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, FISHER and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Ricardo Ramirez-Marentes appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. We granted a certificate of appealability as to “whether the trial
court’s admission of appellant’s statements violated his rights under the Fifth
Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).” We affirm the
thorough and well-reasoned decision of the district court.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1. The state court’s conclusion that Marentes’ unwarned statements were
voluntary is not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Like the district court, we have reviewed the videotape of
the interrogation in question. At a minimum, fairminded jurists could disagree as
to whether Marentes’ will was overborne by the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the giving of his confession. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 434 (2000); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94 (1993) (identifying
potentially relevant circumstances). Although the detectives employed tactics such
as appealing to his conscience and minimizing the moral seriousness of the
offense, Marentes does not identify how these tactics, separately or taken as a
whole, amounted to impermissible police coercion in these circumstances. See
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387 (2010) (“[E]ven where interrogations of
greater duration [than three hours] were held to be improper, they were
accompanied, as this one was not, by other facts indicating coercion, such as an
incapacitated and sedated suspect, sleep and food deprivation, and threats.”);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“[C]oercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The
detectives made no impermissible threats or promises of leniency. Marentes
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became emotional and upset at times, but he otherwise appeared alert, responsive
and coherent throughout his encounter with the detectives, despite his relative
youth. Cf. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1009-13 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
2. Even if Marentes was in custody before the detectives provided him with
Miranda warnings, thus requiring suppression of his pre-Miranda statements, he
has not demonstrated that the admission of his prewarning statements at trial had
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-12 (1991). Although the entire
videotaped confession may have had a “devastating effect” on Marentes’ defense,
Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), his far more damaging
statements came after he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights. Those postwarning statements were admissible, and Marentes fails to
demonstrate how exclusion of only his prewarning statements would have affected
the jury’s verdict.
3. The state court reasonably applied clearly established federal law in
determining that Marentes’ postwarning statements were admissible because they
were voluntary and not obtained in violation of Miranda or its progeny. As the
Supreme Court clarified after the district court issued its decision, clearly
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established federal law encompasses only the holdings of the Supreme Court “as of
‘the time the state court renders its decision.’” Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44
(2011) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011)). Here, Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), is the clearly established law of relevance, because
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), had not yet been decided when the state
court issued its decision. See Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.
2013).
Because all of Marentes’ prewarning statements were voluntary and not the
product of police coercion (whether or not obtained in violation of Miranda), his
“postwarning confession [was] admissible unless it was involuntarily made despite
the Miranda warning.” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.
2006). The state court reasonably determined that Marentes’ postwarning
statements were voluntary based on “the surrounding circumstances and the entire
course of police conduct with respect to [Marentes].” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
After a break, the detectives read Marentes his Miranda rights; Marentes indicated
that he understood these rights and affirmatively agreed to continue answering the
detectives’ questions. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Elstad,
470 U.S. at 318 (holding that a defendant’s decision to continue speaking after
being informed of his rights is “highly probative” of the voluntariness of his
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subsequent statements). Throughout the balance of the interrogation, Marentes
remained responsive and conversational with the detectives, who employed similar
techniques to those used during the prewarning interrogation. The state court
reasonably determined that these techniques were not unduly coercive and that
Marentes’ will was not overborne.
AFFIRMED.
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