Johannes Claus v. Canyon County

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 22 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHANNES CLAUS, No. 22-35292
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00197-REP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CANYON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Raymond Edward Patricco, Jr., Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 6, 2023
Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, CALLAHAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Johannes Claus (“Plaintiff”) appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Canyon County (“Defendant”) on his employment
discrimination claim brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) and his related Idaho state law
emotional distress claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The parties are familiar with the facts of the case, so we do not recite them
here. A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Whitman
v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). A court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. But any factual dispute must be genuine
and material. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). While direct evidence
proffered by the non-moving party is taken as true, even if implausible, the court is
not required “to draw unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence.”
McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
1. The district court correctly held that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that would permit a rational trier of fact to find that Plaintiff’s grievance
regarding his salary, a USERRA-protected right, was a substantial or motivating
factor in Defendant’s decision to terminate him. See Leisek v. Brightwood Corp.,
278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). The material facts surrounding Plaintiff’s
termination are not disputed: he disclosed confidential information to a third party,
his supervisors investigated the disclosure shortly thereafter, and his supervisors
have consistently maintained their belief that he engaged in professional misconduct.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s supervisors resolved the pay dispute in his favor
within three weeks of his request for a salary increase and months before Plaintiff
made the unauthorized disclosure of the witness list. The lack of a connection
between Plaintiff’s exercise of a USERRA-protected right and his termination is
2
fatal to his USERRA claim. Id.Despite the clear support for the district court’s decision, Plaintiff contends
his disclosure of the witness list was a pretextual basis for his termination. He
concedes that there are no examples of attorneys who disclosed confidential
information outside the office but were not fired because they were not veterans
demanding higher pay. He instead relies on other circumstantial evidence, but it
fails to create a plausible nexus between his pay dispute and his termination.
Plaintiff has not identified evidence that impugns the sincerity of the
supervisors’ belief that his disclosure of confidential information to a third party
constituted misconduct, which means there is no genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002).
Because Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence that impugns the sincerity of his
supervisors’ beliefs, it is undisputed that they took what they believed was the proper
course of action to respond to Plaintiff’s disclosure of the witness list. Thus, the
district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s
USERRA claim.
2. Even were we to assume Plaintiff’s pay dispute played some role in his
termination, summary judgment was still proper. There is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding Defendant’s affirmative defense that it would have fired
Plaintiff regardless whether he had demanded higher pay. See Huhmann v. Fed.
3
Express Corp., 874 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2017). As explained above, it is
undisputed that Plaintiff’s supervisors sincerely believed his disclosure of
confidential information to a third party constituted a serious lapse in judgment that
justified his termination. While Plaintiff contests the proper interpretation of Idaho’s
ethics rules, he has not identified any record evidence to suggest the supervisors
doubted the correctness of their interpretation. Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1063.
Because Plaintiff fails to generate a genuine dispute as to the facts supporting
Defendant’s affirmative defense, the district court correctly held that Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on this alternate basis.
3. Both parties agree that Plaintiff’s emotional distress claim fails as a matter
of law given Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s USERRA
claim. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Idaho
2012). Thus, summary judgment was also properly entered in Defendant’s favor on
Plaintiff’s emotional distress claim.
AFFIRMED.
4