Jason Brooks v. Tarsadia Hotels

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON T. BROOKS, No. 21-56125
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:18-cv-02290-GPC-KSC
v.
TARSADIA HOTELS, a California MEMORANDUM*
corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 30, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, SILVERMAN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Jason T. Brooks, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s orders
concerning the settlement of Brooks’s action against Tarsadia Hotels and other
defendants. Brooks alleged violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C), and California law arising from his
purchase of a residential condominium unit in San Diego. Brooks challenges the
district court’s orders enforcing the oral settlement agreement and directing the
settlement funds be deposited into Brooks’s inmate trust fund account. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the
district court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement. Doi v. Halekulani Corp.,
276 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). We review de novo its interpretations of a
settlement agreement, ASARCO, LLC v. Celanese Chem. Co., 792 F.3d 1203, 1208
(9th Cir. 2015), and of state law, Flores v. City of Westminster, 873 F.3d 739, 748
(9th Cir. 2017). “[W]e defer to any factual findings made by the district court in
interpreting the settlement agreement unless they are clearly erroneous.” ASARCO,
LLC, 792 F.3d at 1208 (quoting City of Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251,
1261 (9th Cir. 2010)). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants’ motion
to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court properly found that the
parties entered into an enforceable oral agreement in an early neutral evaluation
before a magistrate judge, with the terms as the magistrate judge memorialized
them. See Doi, 276 F.3d at 1137–38 (district court’s enforcement power extends to
oral agreements, “particularly when the terms are memorialized into the record,”
even if “a party has a change of heart [after agreeing] to [the settlement] terms but
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before the terms are reduced to writing” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Brooks assented to
the agreement and intended to be bound by it. See Ahern v. Cent. Pac. Freight
Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The district court’s finding that [a party]
assented to the settlement and intended to be bound by it must be affirmed unless it
is clearly erroneous.”).
The district court’s order that the settlement funds be paid to Brooks for
deposit into his inmate trust fund account, permitting the Colorado Department of
Corrections to determine what percentage should go toward his criminal restitution
order under state law, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-18.5-106(2), is consistent with the
terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I), (4)(c) (Restitution Act, providing that an order of restitution
is a “final civil judgment in favor of the state and any victim,” which “remains in
force until the restitution is paid in full” and “creates a lien by operation of law
against the defendant’s personal property and any interest that the defendant may
have in any personal property”); People v. Stone, 471 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Colo. App.
2020) (provisions of the Restitution Act should be liberally construed). Moreover,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to consider
constitutional and other legal arguments that Brooks failed to raise in a timely
manner. See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890–91 (9th Cir.
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2000) (no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration
where plaintiffs failed to raise legal issues previously).
The record does not support Brooks’s contentions that the district court was
biased against him, that it published settlement terms in violation of his privacy,
resulting in harm to Brooks, or that Tarsadia Hotels failed to perform under the
settlement agreement.
AFFIRMED.
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